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Abstract  
 
Since Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson tested positive for doping at the 1988 
Olympic games, only two Canadian track and field Olympians have failed a drug test.1;2 
This study examined how the sanctions imposed on Johnson following his transgression 
over thirty years ago, as well as the anti-doping policies created in response to Johnson’s 
positive test, resonated with Canadian track and field athletes and influenced their 
perspective about doping. Nine (n = 9) Canadian Olympians between the ages of 24 and 
55 years (M = 36.67, SD = 9.63) having competed in at least one Olympic games since 
1988 were interviewed. Thematic analysis revealed that participants across three eras 
(1990-2000, 2000-2010 and 2010-2019) believed Canada does not deal with a doping 
problem because a greater expectation of morality exists in their nation, the sanctions for 
doping are greater than in other countries, and drug testing and education is more 
frequent and extensive than in other countries. Olympians who competed in era one 
believe Johnson’s transgression had more influence on these reasons for competing 
cleanly in Canada than do participants of eras two and three. Indeed, as time goes by, 
Johnson’s sanctions have decreasing resonance with Canadian track and field Olympians, 
but the anti-doping policies established following Johnson’s doping scandal continue to 
promote clean competition in Canadian track and field in meaningful ways. 
 
 
                                                          
1Athletes currently suspended from all competitions in athletics following an Anti-Doping Rule Violation 
as at: 09.07.15," IAAF, October 16, 2015, retrieved on February 6, 2019, www.iaaf.org. 
2 “Sports People: Track and Field; Sprinter is Banned.” New York Times. July 12, 1992. 
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Research Article 
Purpose 
Ian Ritchie, an expert in the field of doping in high-level sport, has argued that Ben 
Johnson’s positive steroid test in 1988 and the resulting Dubin Inquiry were pivotal events for 
strengthening the anti-doping movement in Canadian track and field.3  This study aims to 
provide a more comprehensive exploration of that assertion – particularly from the perspective of 
Canadian Olympic track and field athletes.  Using a tri-generational sample, this research aims to 
assess the roles of Johnson and the Dubin Inquiry in shaping anti-doping culture in Canadian 
track and field since Johnson’s positive test in the Seoul Olympics and the heavily publicized 
scrutiny provided by the Dubin Inquiry a year later. Specifically, the researcher investigates how 
Johnson’s sanctions serve to discourage doping in Canadian track and field. Canadian Olympians 
across three eras (1990 to 2000, 2000 to 2010, and 2010 to the study’s data collection date 
(spring 2019)) were interviewed with the aim of identifying not only whether events around 
Johnson’s transgression resonate with Canadian track and field athletes, but how it does so 
across time. This paper’s findings about the effectiveness of various anti-doping strategies in 
Canadian track and field may give direction to efforts and decisions of future movements against 
doping. 
Introduction/Context 
          On September 24, 1988, Jamaican-born Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson won the 100m 
final in the Olympics. His clocking of 9.79 seconds constituted a world record and made him a 
stunning 14 hundredths of a second faster than history’s second-best time. Prior to his Olympic 
                                                          
3 Ian Ritchie, “Keep a Lid on the Crisis: Anti-Doping in Canada Since 1983,” Performance Enhancement & Health 
3 (2015): 114. 
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win, Johnson was the twice-defending Lou Marsh Trophy winner (given to Canada’s top athlete) 
in 1986 and 1987. His triumph further built his legacy as a top Canadian athlete and solidified his 
status as a “national sensation” – and the most internationally celebrated male victor of the Seoul 
Olympics4 – at a time when Canada experienced a national identity crisis, brought forth by the 
looming Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States.5 Perhaps for that reason, 
Canadians celebrated the win as their greatest Olympic moment.6 
          Johnson spoke on the telephone with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney after the 
race. Mulroney expressed his pride on behalf of the entire nation and called the event a 
“marvelous evening for Canada.”7 His glorification, however, was short-lived. Barely three days 
after winning the gold medal, the IOC stripped Johnson of his accomplishment when a drug test 
by the Olympic Doping Control Centre revealed the presence of an anabolic steroid, Stanozolol, 
in his urine. In Canada, the initial shock and disbelief quickly turned into anger and resentment.  
Federal sports minister Jean Charest declared Johnson should never represent Canada again.8 
          Johnson’s steroid use quickly permeated world media. Political authorities, journalists and 
fans alike communicated distaste for Johnson’s actions, and the Canadian federal government 
launched The Commission of Inquiry Into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to 
Increase Athletic Performance (commonly referred to as the Dubin Inquiry. The inquiry, led by 
Ontario Chief Justice Charles Dubin, commenced on January 11 and concluded on October 3, 
1989. It involved 119 witnesses, produced 14,817 pages of testimony and cost Canadian 
                                                          
4  John MacAloon, “Steroids and the State. Melodrama and the Accomplishment of Innocence,” Public Culture 2, 
no. 2 (1990): 41-42, https://doi.org/10.1215/08992363-2-2-41. 
5 Stephen Jackson, “Life in the (Mediated) Faust Lane,” International Review for the Sociology of Sport 33, no. 3 
(1998): 228, doi: 10.1177/101269098033003001. 
6 MacAloon, “Steroids,” 42.  
7 Stephen Jackson and Pam Ponic, “Pride and Prejudice: Reflecting on Sport Heroes, National Identity, and Crisis in    
Canada,” Sport in Society 4, no. 2 (2001): 43-62, https://doi.org/10.1080/713999819. 
8 MacAloon, “Steroids,” 56. 
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taxpayers $3.6 million.9 The inquiry extensively examined Johnson’s drug use, as well as that of 
his teammates on the Scarborough Optimists Track and Field Club, coached by Charlie 
Francis.10 At its conclusion, the inquiry was described as “an extraordinary pageant of irony, 
tragedy, and farce.” 11 This investigation led to months of astonishing testimony that included 
public confessions of cheating by Johnson, Francis and several of Johnson’s track and field club 
teammates12 and the creation of the CCDS, a strengthened drug-testing program in Canada. 13 At 
its conclusion, Justice Dubin recommended that government funding in sport should be based on 
ethical principles.14 Johnson was stripped of his government funding and was eventually banned 
from track and field for life after a second transgression.15 
          For the duration of the inquiry, Canadian media coverage depicted Johnson as a pariah. 
Broadcasters and newspapers across the country vilified the sprinter and made him the focus of 
alienating headlines that clearly communicated disapproval of his behaviour.16 Canadian media 
captured widespread public reactions of  shock and disbelief, humiliation, despair, mourning and 
tragedy. Citizen-in-the-street interviews drew comments such as “People feel miserable,” “The 
national psyche is scarred,” and “When (Johnson) won everyone was proud to be a Canadian. 
There is no gold now.”17 Johnson’s cheating was so poorly received that it elicited a crisis in 
Canadian national identity and remained a national embarrassment to Canada’s sporting 
                                                          
9 “Ben Johnson Becomes Canada’s Golden Hero at Seoul Olympics,” CBC, September 24, 1988, 
https://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/congratulating-canadas-golden-hero. 
10 MacAloon, “Steroids,” 43. 
11Varda Burstyn, “The Sporting Life,” Saturday Night 105, no. 2 (1990): 45. 
12MacAloon, “Steroids,” 56. 
13 Ian Ritchie and Greg Jackson, “Politics and ‘Shock’: Reactionary Anti-Doping Policy Objectives in Canadian and 
International Sport,” International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 6, no. 1 (2014): 206, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/19406940.2013.773358. 
14 Lucie Thibault and Jean Harvey, Sport Policy in Canada (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2013), 276. 
15Johnson was given the opportunity to return to competition in 1991, but following another positive test in 1993 (he 
was found using testosterone), he was banned for life. In April 1999, a Canadian adjudicator ruled that there had 
been procedural errors in the decision of 1993, and allowed Ben Johnson to appeal the ban. Johnson was granted 
permission to compete provided he raced alone. In late 1999, he tested positive for the third time (Rowbottom 2013). 
16Jackson and Ponic, “Pride and Prejudice,” 51. 
17 MacAloon, “Steroids,” 42. 
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community for many years.18  Johnson, who was transformed from Jamaican immigrant to 
Canadian in the media as he became more successful, was quickly redefined as Jamaican-
Canadian upon his disqualification. According to the Sports Illustrated writer Michael Farber, 
“There was a disqualification at Seoul, a qualification at home. Johnson was now a ‘Jamaican-
Canadian.’”19 
          Whether Johnson’s initial transgression would have elicited such a negative response in a 
nation other than Canada is an interesting question. Disparity seems to exist between the 
Canadian government, media and people’s sanctioning of Johnson and the Russian government’s 
seemingly idle treatment of doping Russian athletes in the face of its recent doping scandal. In 
May 2016, the long-time director of Russia’s anti-doping laboratory, Grigory Rodchenkov, 
revealed the existence of Russia’s long-standing state-sponsored doping program to The New 
York Times and to Bryan Fogel, the director of the 2016 award-winning documentary Icarus.20 
Rodchenkov had helped the program flourish for a decade and helped Russian athletes cheat 
rampantly at the 2014 Sochi Olympic Games, where Russian officials expunged an estimated 
100 dirty urine samples.21 Indeed, anti-doping experts and members of the intelligence service 
surreptitiously replaced urine samples tainted by performance-enhancing drugs with clean urine 
collected months earlier, somehow breaking into the supposedly tamper-proof bottles that are the 
standard at international competitions.22  
          Following Rodchenkov’s allegations, WADA launched an investigation into Russian 
doping, led by Canadian law professor Richard McLaren, and released a report later in 2016. The 
                                                          
18 Jackson and Ponic, “Pride and Prejudice,” 52. 
19 Ibid, 54. 
20 Rebecca Ruiz and Michael Schwirtz, “Russian Insider Says State-Run Doping Fuels Olympic Gold,” New York 
Times, May 12, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016 /05/13/sports/russia-doping-sochi-olympics-2014.html. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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report uncovered evidence of a state-sponsored doping program that benefited more than 1,000 
athletes across 30 disciplines.23 The IOC then banned Russia from the 2016 Rio Olympic 
Games.24 Despite the ban, Russian political authorities and athletic bodies – though they 
admitted to an extant doping problem at the time of the IOC Disciplinary Commission’s report 
just prior to the 2018 Olympic Games25 – continuously deny the existence of a state-sponsored 
doping program. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Olympic officials even publicly 
berated and ridiculed Rodchenkov for exposing the program.26 Evidently, the Putin government 
has requested no public inquiry or investigation into their athletic transgressions, as did the 
Canadian government years earlier (though the researcher acknowledges the possibility that 
justice was meted out by the Russian government beyond the gaze of global media). Russia was 
still suspended by the time of the Pyeongchang Olympic Games in 2018 but 169 Russian athletes 
were given permission to compete under a neutral flag by a three-person IOC panel.27 Those 
athletes went on to account for half the positive tests and doping violations in Pyeongchang.28 
Presently, anti-doping executives around the world suspect that Russian athletes continue to 
dope.29;30 
          The Canadian government, media and public rejection of Johnson in 1988 evidently 
contrasts Russian authorities’ ongoing denial of its doping program. The Russian athletes that 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 “Rio Olympics 2016: Russia fails to overturn athlete ban for next month's Games,” BBC, July 21, 2016, 
https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/36855244. 
25 Samuel Schmid, “IOC Disciplinary Commission’s Report to the IOC Executive Board,” Report for the  
International Olympic Committee, December 2, 2017, Lausanne, 2. 
26 Richard Perez-Pena and Tariq Panja, “28 Russian Athletes Win Appeals of Doping Bans,” New York Times, 
February 1, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/sports/olympics/russia-doping-ban.html. 
27 James Ellingworth, “Second Russian Athlete Tests Positive for Doping at Olympics,” The Associated Press, 
February 23, 2018, https://globalnews.ca/news/4043080/winter-olympics-2018-russian-athlete-doping-bobsleigh/. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Sean Ingle, “Russian Anti-Doping Agency Suspended by WADA for Non-Compliance,” The Guardian, 
November 18, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/nov/18/ russian-anti-doping-agency-suspended-wada. 
30USADA, Statement on The WADA Executive Committee’s Decision to Reinstate Russia from Travis T. Tygart, 
CEO, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, 2018, Colorado Springs. 
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doped, outwardly, seem somewhat free of domestic persecution. Different standards of 
punishment for doping could contribute to the seemingly striking difference in athlete doping 
behaviour between the two countries. Now 30 years have passed since Johnson and several of his 
teammates admitted to cheating. While the researcher acknowledges the doping issues that are 
evident the various levels of athletics, only two Canadian track and field Olympians were given 
two-year bans by the IAAF for doping since 1988: Cheryl Thibedeau, an alternate runner in the 
4x100m relay in 1992, and Alicia Brown, a 400m runner that represented Canada in 2016, after 
testing positive in 2013. 31;32  
It is possible that Johnson’s transgression and the publicized inquiry that followed it33 
discouraged future Canadian Olympians from doping out of fear of facing similar social 
consequences to Johnson. As well, researchers believe that Johnson’s transgression led Canadian 
anti-doping to set some of the most stringent drug-testing and extensive drug education policies 
in the world.34;35 Notably, Johnson’s positive test helped develop a strong education protocol36 
and frequency of drug testing.37 It is inferable that Johnson’s transgression impacted anti-doping 
in Canada. That being said, we still know little about how Johnson’s scandal resonates with 
Canadian Olympians, and how it influences their decisions about doping. Exploring Canadian 
track and field athletes’ clean approach to sport represents a valuable opportunity for 
understanding motivations to refrain from doping, but an investigation of the reasons these 
                                                          
31World Anti-Doping Agency, “Anti-Doping Rule Violations (ADVRs) Report,” 2015-2019, https://www.wada-
ama.org/en/resources/general-anti-doping- information/anti-doping-rule-violations-adrvs-report. 
32 New York Times. “Sprinter is Banned.” 
33 MacAloon, “Steroids,” 42-53. 
34 Bruce Kidd, Robert Edelman and Susan Brownell, “Comparative Analysis of Doping Scandals: Canada, Russia, 
and China,” in Doping in Elite Sport: the Politics of Drugs in the Olympic Movement ed. Wayne Wilson 
(Champaign, Human Kinetics Publishers, 2001): 154. 
35 Ritchie, “Lid on the Crisis,” 114. 
36 Susan Backhouse, Laurie Patterson and Jim McKenna, “Achieving the Olympic Ideal: Preventing Doping in 
Sport,” Performance Enhancement and Health 1, no. 2 (2012): 83, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.peh.2012.08.001. 
37 Matthew Dunn et al., “Drug Testing in Sport: The Attitudes and Experiences of Elite Athletes,” The International 
Journal of Drug Policy 21, no. 4 (2009): 330, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.drugpo.2009.12.005. 
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athletes compete cleanly has yet to be conducted. An investigation into a seemingly clean 
nation’s reasons for competing without the use of drugs is clearly needed, in a time when anti-
doping research explores a shift from detection and towards prevention. 38;39 
Thesis 
The researcher contends that Johnson’s transgression influenced future Canadian track 
and field Olympians to compete cleanly by creating an expectation of severe treatment in 
response to a positive test, and by influencing the development of anti-doping policy in Canadian 
track and field. Johnson’s penalties resonated with Olympians that competed close in time to his 
positive test, and had an important influence on their decisions to compete cleanly. As time 
passed, Johnson’s incident and the Dubin Inquiry’s scandalous drama had less influence on 
Canadian Olympians’ decisions to dope. The anti-doping policies and strategies that resulted 
from the scandal became the key instrument in the promotion clean sport in Canadian track and 
field – even if the origins of these policies and strategies are unknown to the newer generation of 
athletes. Indeed, events surrounding Ben Johnson’s sanctions pushed Canadian sport authorities 
to adopt some of the most stringent anti-doping policies in the world.40 Those policies include 
frequent drug testing and a rigorous and extensive drug education protocol. The spirit of sport 
language (Appendix D) created in response to the Inquiry, which promotes a “values-based 
image of sport,”41;42 also contributes to an expectation of moral conduct in Canadian track and 
field and discourages doping. This study argues that while Canadians Olympians are becoming 
                                                          
38Giuseppe Lippi, Massimo Franchidi and Gian Gidi Cesare, “Tour de Chaos,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 
41, no. 10 (2007): 625-626, https://doi.10.1136/bjsm.2007.035519. 
39 Fabio Lucidi et al., “The Social-Cognitive Mechanisms Regulating Adolescents’ use of Doping Substances,” 
Journal of Sports Sciences 26, no. 5 (2008): 447, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02640410701579370. 
40  Ritchie, “Lid on Crisis,” 114. 
41 Ian Ritchie, “The Construction of a Policy: The World Anti-Doping Code’s ‘Spirit of Sport’ Clause,” 
Performance Enhancement and Health 2 (2014): 194, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.peh.2014.10.002. 
42 Ritchie, “Lid on Crisis,” 114. 
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decreasingly conscious of the “Johnson effect” over time, the policies developed from Johnson’s 
transgression generated lasting changes on the national doping landscape and continue to 
influence Canadian athletes’ seemingly clean approach to sport. 
Methods 
Participants 
Participants included five male and four female (N = 9) Canadian Olympic track and 
field athletes between the ages of 24 and 55 years (M = 36.67, SD = 9.63) who had competed 
over the last three decades. Three participants represented Canada for the first time between 
1990 and 2000, two between 2000 and 2010, and four between 2010 and the time of data 
collection (Spring 2019). The division of participants in these three eras was done in this thesis 
to help illustrate differences in how (and whether) participants perceive the impact of Johnson’s 
sanctions on their personal decisions about doping. The researcher deemed it important to gauge 
how Johnson’s sanctions resonated with participants across generations, given that people tend to 
gradually lose interest in a scandal over time and decreasingly reflect on its consequences.43 
      Recruiting participants from various generations was also important. Participants had to 
be Canadian Olympic track and field athletes. All participants, according to public record, had 
never tested positive for the use of performance-enhancing substances, but a clean doping record 
was not a requirement for participation. Participant demographic information (including age, sex 
and length of career) was acquired moments before each recorded interview and cross-referenced 
                                                          
43 Rasmus Storm and Ulrik Wagner, “The Anatomy of Sport Scandal: Outset, Development and Effect,” Paper 
presented at Play the Game Conference, 2011, Cologne. 
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with public record information, so as to help draw eventual conclusions about demographic-
related differences.  
Design and Methodology 
Semi-structured interviews  
Individual, open-ended, semi-structured interviews were conducted with each participant. 
In semi-structured interviewing, a question guide is used (Appendix A), with questions and 
topics that must be covered. The interviewer has some discretion about the order in which 
questions are asked, but the questions are standardized, and probes may be provided to ensure 
that the researcher covers the appropriate topics.44 Semi-structured interviews, compared to 
structured interviews, provide the interviewees with a greater opportunity to express their 
thoughts and feelings, and allow the participant to elaborate on the different meanings they 
attach to their experiences.45 
The semi-structured interview guide was composed of two sections and ten questions in 
total, and aimed to investigate whether Johnson’s sanctions and scandal affected participants’ 
decisions regarding doping. The first section was designed to help the researcher inquire about 
the participants’ sentiments and understanding about the existence of doping in athletics. Lead 
questions included: “Are you fully aware of the consequences that accompany a positive drug 
test? What are those consequences?” and “were you aware of opportunities for doping and if so, 
what factors influenced athletes’ decision to engage in doping?” The second section was 
composed of questions that inquire about the participants’ knowledge and sentiment about 
                                                          
44  Margaret Harrell and Melissa Bradley, Data Collection Methods; Semi Structured Interviews and Focus Groups 
(Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 27. 
45 Andrew Sparkes and Brett Smith, Qualitative Research Methods in Sport, Exercise and Health: From Process to 
Product (New York: Routledge, 2014), 37. 
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Canada’s treating of Johnson. Lead questions included: “Does Ben Johnson and the Dubin 
Inquiry have an impact on your perception of doping sanctions?” and later: “do you think the 
consequences for doping are different in Canada than they are in other countries?  If so, why, if 
not, why not?” The researcher did not ask about participants’ own experiences with doping, as 
obliged by the University of Windsor’s Research Ethics Board. Instead, the researcher used 
probing questions to explore the situations in which doping seems facilitated or discouraged.46 
          The interviews were completed via Skype on the researcher’s cell phone. This method was 
selected over in-person interviews based on geographical practicality. The researcher deemed the 
Skype method adequate in preserving anonymity for a few reasons. First, the researcher’s cell 
phone and Skype account were both locked with two distinct passcodes and, second, recorded 
interviews could be easily saved and deleted. The researcher deleted the interview files six weeks 
following the interviews. This timeframe gave the researcher sufficient time to transcribe 
interviews and open member checking to participants before the deletion of the interview. 
Member checking involved notifying participants that the preliminary transcription of their 
interview would be available to them for one full week (seven days), should they decide to 
remove, add, or change parts of or full responses. The final transcriptions of all interviews 
comprised 57 single-spaced pages, which were then stored in a locked cabinet in the office of the 
researcher following transcription. 
Oral History 
         The researcher followed methods of oral history during the process of data collection and 
transcription, because important parts of the participants’ testimonies relied on their recall of 
historical records. Oral history collects memories and personal commentaries of historical 
                                                          
46 Berbecaru et al., “Theoretical and Methodological Aspects on Doping Phenomenon in Elite Athletes,” Procedia –  
Social and Behavioural Sciences 149 (2014): 103, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.08.168. 
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significance through recorded interviews.47 Methods of oral history are based on multiple 
academic disciplines (including history, sociology, anthropology, law, journalism and 
psychology) and help the researcher to address the historical record directly, to clarify what they 
see as misconceptions in third-person accounts, and permits the participant to provide their own 
personal assessment of the significance of the events in which they took part.48 Oral history is a 
vital tool for understanding the intersections between the private and the public.49 Given the 
covert nature of the topic of doping, gaining participants’ private accounts of their perspectives 
and insights with doping in sport – content not expected to be publicly accessible - was deemed 
valuable for this research. For these reasons, oral history methodology was considered 
appropriate.                            
          During data collection, oral history methodology requires the researcher to remain 
impartial, listen and stay in the background, yet be a catalyst and direct line of inquiry by asking 
probing questions.50 The oral history researcher is also expected to follow steps, which include 
conducting a preliminary search of record (literature review), designing a treatment (conducting 
interviews) and writing a slate of draft questions to help prepare the researcher prior to each 
interview.51 During transcription, again adhering to oral history methodology, the researcher 
prepared the data for analysis. The researcher filled in missing names and dates in the participant 
interviews using brackets. When editing, the researcher made no attempt to alter the patterns and 
tones of the data to produce perfectly constructed sentences, in the goal of preserving the 
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authenticity and spontaneity of the interviews.52 The researcher recognizes that these techniques 
are dated more than twenty years, and that new and potentially more effective guidelines for oral 
history now exist. For instance, Kaufman suggests that in the video age, a best method of oral 
history presentation would be one combining digital video and audio for people’s engagement.53 
The researcher had no intention to present data with the help of video as that runs counter to the 
objective of participant anonymity, which was necessary for this study based on feedback from 
the University of Windsor’s Research Ethics Board. Also for that reason, the researcher opted for 
data transcription instead of using Stories Matter, an oral history software that uses video as an 
alternative to transcription.54 Transcription associated no permanent video to participants, and 
enhanced the privacy of the data. 
Framework  
The researcher used Paternoster’s criminal deterrence theory as a starting point when 
constructing interview questions.55 Criminal deterrence theory is a highly influential approach to 
understanding criminal decision-making56 and posits that individuals will have strong intentions 
to perform a behaviour if they have a positive attitude towards it, they perceive it as easy to 
perform, and they believe that important others would support their performance of the 
behaviour.57 Specifically, criminal deterrence theory suggests that when individuals contemplate 
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committing a crime they weigh up the costs and benefits of doing so.58 Analogously in sport, 
athletes weigh deterrents (costs) and benefits against each other in deciding whether to dope.59 
The theory’s prominence in doping research suggested that participants might engage in a cost-
benefit analysis when making decisions about doping. The researcher then aimed for the 
interviews to explore whether such an analysis was made and, specifically, whether the 
perceived fear of suffering sanctions like Johnson acted as a cost of doping. Leading questions 
inquired about what participants perceived as costs and benefits of doping. Probing questions 
aimed to uncover which perceived costs led participants to compete cleanly.    
The researcher was aware that criminal deterrence theory is sometimes criticized by 
researchers for having limited empirical support60 and for being too simplistic to explain 
decisions related to doping; it is widely accepted in doping research that complete knowledge for 
specific causes of doping is complex and involves a combination of individual, social-collective, 
cultural and situational factors,61 and is influenced by personality structure.62 Because criminal 
deterrence theory does not take into account personality differences and for its general lack of 
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nuance, it may be best thought of as a ‘mid-range’ theory, that is, one that is useful in specific 
circumstances, as opposed to a general theory that seeks to explain all types of offending.63 
 Criminal deterrence theory does not completely account for doping behaviour, but it 
should not be disregarded when conducting research about doping decisions. Cost-benefit 
analysis is still central to athletes’ decisions regarding doping today64 and WADA’s anti-doping 
policy has relied heavily on the deterrence value of doping controls.65;66 Despite its 
shortcomings, criminal deterrence theory is the premise underpinning the criminal justice 
systems in most countries,67 so the researcher deemed the theory an appropriate starting point for 
the formulation of interview questions for this research. The researcher also elected the use of 
criminal deterrence theory as a basis for inquiry because this study investigates perceptions of 
elite athletes. Elite athletes are more likely to engage in a cost-benefit analysis when making 
decisions about doping, given what they stand to gain from a competitive advantage and how 
much they have to lose from apprehension.68 It was also found that elite athletes are more likely 
to comply with the law if they perceive the costs of breaking it as outweighing the benefits.69 
 It is important to expect that the applicability of criminal deterrence theory vary across 
individuals due to expected differences in personal feelings of shame and guilt.70 Johnson’s 
actions following the scandal might serve as a good example of personal differences in 
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predisposition to guilt and shame. While Johnson’s incident may have helped deter future 
athletes to dope, it did not make him refrain from doping following the scandal, despite knowing 
of the consequences firsthand. As mentioned earlier, Johnson tested positive for performance-
enhancing substances again in 1993, and again in 1999. 
Procedure and Data Collection 
           Formal recruiting began once the researcher received clearance from the University of 
Windsor’s Research Ethics Board. Participants were recruited for a study described as “Canadian 
Track and Field Olympians’ Perspective of Doping Deterrents in Canada.” The researcher 
omitted the name “Ben Johnson” in the presented title, so as to avoid potential refusal of 
participation by those unfamiliar with Johnson, as the responses of such participants were 
deemed equally valuable to the research process. Participants were granted anonymity and 
offered member checking – data were available to participants for one full week (seven days) 
following the researcher’s transcription of the interview. Participants were given the opportunity 
to change, add or remove parts or all of their data in this timeframe. Criterion-based sampling, 
which involves identifying a set of criteria for selecting cases, sites, or places71 was used to 
identify Olympic track and field athletes that could provide rich data. The researcher defined rich 
data as the collection of perspective of athletes across sexes and eras. Participants were identified 
first by using the researcher’s network of contacts, and then by snowball sampling, the process 
whereby the researcher asks participants to identify other individuals that satisfy the study’s 
inclusion criteria.72 Informed consent from the participants was requested. The researcher aimed 
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to achieve rich and saturated data by achieving and surpassing the number of interviews deemed 
sufficient in qualitative research for understanding the essence of an experience.73  
Data Analysis 
          The researcher first managed the data documents through interview transcripts and field 
notes of observations. Data from interviews were categorized using thematic analysis, a method 
compatible and close in style with oral history.74 This technique is widely used in the social 
sciences for its clear and usable framework.75 Thematic analysis, developed by Braun and Clark 
requires the researcher to transcribe the interview data verbatim.76 The researcher then follows 
six phases with the goal of finding resemblances and repeated ideas within the data set, to 
eventually identify themes in data, so as to draw conclusions about those themes.77  The phases 
followed in this analysis were (in order):  
          1) Familiarization with data (immersion): the researcher reads data actively and repeatedly 
so as to search for meanings and patterns, while taking preliminary notes about these patterns.78 
2) Coding the data: the researcher codes the data into categories to facilitate the identification of 
themes.79 The researcher coded with the help of colours and families of words to facilitate the 
identification of themes. 3) identifying themes: this phase involves separating data into broad 
potential themes once the researcher is familiar with the data and collating all the relevant coded 
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data extracts within the identified themes.80 The themes that emerged from this research were: 
Thoughts about Johnson and the Dubin Inquiry, personal reasons for competing cleanly, and how 
anti-doping differs between Canada and other countries. 4) Review and refining themes; this 
phase permits the researcher to further break down or merge themes, so as to form a good idea of 
the major themes, and the story they help tell.81 5) defining and naming themes: the researcher 
identifies the essence of each theme, and writes a detailed analysis for each theme and comments 
on the data found.82 6) finalizing the thematic structure: the researcher writes a final analysis, 
which contains nuanced narrative of the data and sufficient evidence of themes into a final 
report.83 Phases two through five of the thematic analysis were facilitated by the use of NVivo 
qualitative data analysis software. The NVivo software helps in linking, shaping, searching for, 
and modeling the data. In the qualitative method, according to many researchers, the NVivo 
software is useful for the data management because there is a number of ways the researcher 
manages the NVivo data.84 Specifically, in oral history research, the NVivo software is a popular 
option among oral historians in organization, coding and analysis capacities and is often used to 
disseminate interview data.85  
Results  
The researcher investigated how Johnson’s sanctions have influenced Canada’s anti-
doping environment and participants’ personal reasons for competing cleanly. Results reveal era 
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differences in how participants think Johnson’s sanctions have affected anti-doping in Canada. 
Participants that competed closer in time to Johnson’s transgression believed it had more 
influence on the development of clean sport in Canadian track and field, and on their personal 
decisions to compete cleanly.  In the presentation of these results, participants are divided into 
categories – those who represented Canada between 1990 and 2000 are referred to as participants 
of era one. Era two spans from 2000 to 2010, and era three comprises 2011 to the date of data 
collection (spring 2019). Participants whose Olympic participation transcends eras were 
categorized based on the date of their first Olympic games. While generational differences 
between participants are uncovered, sex differences are not talked about for two reasons. First, 
differences in testimonies between sexes were negligible, which is a finding consistent with 
contemporary research on perceived sanctions of doping.86 Second, participants’ genders are 
kept hidden in an effort to preserve participant anonymity. 
Perception of the Johnson Scandal and the Dubin Inquiry 
Familiarity  
          A first important point to visit was the participants’ knowledge and understanding of 
Johnson’s incident. Interviews revealed generational differences in the participants’ familiarity 
with his transgression, opinions of the Canadian media, government and people’s treatment of 
him, and perceptions of the event’s ramifications in Canadian track and field. 
          All nine participants (n = 9) knew of Johnson’s identity as a Canadian sprinter, and knew 
of his involvement with performance enhancing substances. The participants’ degree of 
familiarity with the Dubin Inquiry, however, varied considerably. Participants that represented 
Canada in era one all displayed an appreciation for the importance and ubiquity of the Inquiry. 
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One participant said: “the Ben Johnson scandal and (the) Dubin (Inquiry) was ‘the’ doping event 
in Canada. And more so than Johnson, it was Dubin.” Another participant has visceral memories 
of the televised coverage of the Inquiry. They said: “the Dubin Inquiry was huge. I remember 
watching it on TV every day for a whole spring break (...) it was on (TV) all the time, there were 
a million different stories.” 
          All participants of eras two and three (n = 6) were aware of the existence of the Dubin 
Inquiry, but did not follow it as closely and did not remember it as vividly as participants of era 
one. Two participants of era two remembered the event vaguely, and the others claimed to be too 
young to remember it themselves. Three participants were not born. One participant (era three) 
said: “I think we are too many generations removed now to really know much about it.” Out of 
the six participants from eras two and three, however, four (n = 4) claimed to be knowledgeable 
about Johnson’s transgression and the ensuing Inquiry because of its ongoing perpetuation in 
Canadian media. One participant (era two) said: “(I am familiar with Johnson’s transgression and 
the Dubin Inquiry) as much as anybody that is infatuated with track and field could be. 
Obviously I’ve read Speed Trap (a book by Johnson’s coach, Charlie Francis), (ESPN feature 
film) 30 for 30, (2012 film) 9.79, you name it. I’ve been to charliefrancis.com.” Another 
participant (era three) claimed he or she “knows as much as regular people know, which is 
probably a good amount,” before acknowledging that Johnson’s story is “really available in the 
media, still.” Importantly, every participant knew of Johnson, that he represented Canada, and 
that he was caught in a substantial doping scandal.  
Perceived consequences of the Inquiry 
The participants’ perceptions of the severity and appropriateness of Johnson’s sanctions 
were assessed. In general, participants were unaware of the severity of his legal ban, marginally 
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aware of the financial repercussions of his transgression, and very much aware of ensuing social 
repercussions. Six participants (n = 6) inaccurately thought Johnson was banned for life after the 
Dubin Inquiry, and none recalled that he had returned to competition in 1993, and again in 1999. 
Only two participants (n = 2), both of era one, were aware that Johnson had lost all government 
funding, while three participants of eras two and three (n = 3) said they believed he suffered 
some sort of financial sanction. Seven participants across eras (n = 7) believed that Johnson was 
rejected socially, to the point of being a “pariah” with a “forever tarnished name.” One 
participant (era one) recalls ubiquitous social disapproval for Johnson soon after his positive test. 
“I had never seen someone fall so hard,” they said. “All the headlines were after him... people 
hated him.” Another participant said: “(Johnson) went from being on top of the world to people 
wanting nothing to do with him.” A third participant (era two) said: “it probably cost him a lot of 
relationships... a lot of friends and family in the sport.” Six (n = 6) of those seven participants 
who believed Johnson was socially rejected following his transgression thought the sanctions 
were appropriate. One participant (era one) says: “you know, you get caught, and you’re done. 
That’s how it has to be.” Another participant (era three) says: “it was probably a difficult 
experience for (Johnson) but he cheated, and you have to face consequences.” One participant of 
era two did not think Johnson’s sanctions were appropriate. According to this participant, doping 
was rampant in track and field in 1988, and Johnson was sanctioned more severely than many 
other athletes who doped but never got caught doing so. “I don’t want to see (Johnson) take the 
blame for something that’s bigger than himself,” they said. 
Five participants (n = 5), three of era one, one of era two and one of era three believed 
that Canadian track and field currently does not struggle with a drug problem in part because of 
how severely Johnson was punished after testing positive. Only two participants, both of era one, 
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mentioned Johnson’s positive impact on Canada’s doping landscape unsolicited. The other three 
participants came to similar conclusions only once the researcher asked them what they believed 
that Johnson’s sanctions had impacted Canadian anti-doping in any way. One participant (era 
three) says: “it’s funny, (Johnson) may have helped the doping problem in Canada. Nobody after 
Ben Johnson wanted to be Ben Johnson.”  
Five participants (n = 5) across eras believed Johnson’s sanctioning and his testimony at 
the Dubin Inquiry discouraged Canadian athletes to dope, for fear of suffering similar sanctions. 
One participant (era two) says: “I think the fact that (the scandal) was a big deal and that 
(Johnson) fell hard makes us scared to suffer the same fate (...) it was an example of ‘you don’t 
do it.’” Another participant (era three) said: “if a Canadian athlete was gonna think about doping, 
and they see how much Ben Johnson – like how much his career got jeopardized because he 
doped, I don’t think they’d want to do it. Especially if you’re from Canada because Ben Johnson 
showed us what would happen here.” A third participant (era one) said: “I think a lot of people 
looked at (the scandal and sanctioning) as ‘that’s what can happen if you get caught, that’s what 
will happen if you dope.’” Again, only participants of era one mentioned that Johnson’s sanction 
contributed to a fear of social sanctions before the researcher brought up the topic of Johnson. 
Four participants (n = 4; two of era one, one of era two and one of era three) expressed 
that Johnson’s transgression influenced the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES) to 
tighten their testing protocol and that an elevated chance of getting tested discourages Canadians 
from doping in the present day. One participant (era one) said: “(Johnson) highlighted how deep 
the problem was, and maybe forced drug testers to catch up.” The three other participants 
thought drug testing had become more frequent and sophisticated in Canada since the Inquiry. “I 
think the whole Ben Johnson fiasco made it like this,” said one participant (era three).” Another 
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participant (era two), speaking to the stringency of testing, said: “Maybe as a residue, maybe as 
an after-effect of the Dubin Inquiry – we set the standard ‘this is how it is going to be done, this 
is how we are going to do it.’ ”  
 One participant (era two) thought Johnson’s positive test and the ensuing inquiry created 
negligible positive ramifications for anti-doping in Canada. This participant negated the 
aforementioned perception that Johnson’s transgression helped to turn future athletes away from 
doping. “I think it did nothing for anti-doping,” says the participant, before suggesting that less 
athletes tested positive after 1988 because performance-enhancing drugs became more 
sophisticated and harder to detect on drug tests. “(1990s sprinting stars) Linford Christie, 
Donovan Bailey and Maurice Greene would pack stadiums,” says the participant. “None of them 
failed tests, and I find that very suspicious.” This participant was the only one of the sample to 
deny any direct benefit to anti-doping coming from the Inquiry. 
          Three participants (n = 3) acknowledged that the scandal and Inquiry had both positive and 
negative outcomes. Two participants (era one and era three) spoke of the financial burden the 
Inquiry caused Athletics Canada, the national governing body of Canadian track and field. “I am 
from the generation that suffered most from the financial crumbling of Athletics Canada,” says a 
participant from era one. This participant said the doping incident made Canadian athletes lose 
financial support and increased fans’ cynicism while decreasing their interest in track and field. 
“Ben Johnson was kind of the point of no return for fans,” says this participant. “After that, the 
expert and non-expert perceptions in Canada was that everyone was doping. His impact on the 
public was bad and it was absolutely huge.” A participant from era three says: “Athletics Canada 
had to completely rebuild their image and their structure because one athlete had hindered it.” A 
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third participant (era two) says Johnson’s cheating transcended track and field and “sunk the 
legacy of sport in Canada.” 
Influence on own doping decisions 
          While most participants thought that Johnson’s transgression and the Dubin Inquiry had 
major consequences (positive or negative) in Canadian track and field, and that Johnson’s 
combined sanctions (social, financial and legal) were severe, only three participants (n = 3), all 
of era one, claimed that the reaction to Johnson’s transgression directly influenced their personal 
decision to compete cleanly. The six participants of eras two and three acknowledged that 
Johnson’s incident had a negligible impact on their personal decision to compete cleanly.  
          Three (n = 3) of these six participants cited a difference in fame between Johnson and 
themselves that made his story less relatable. One participant (era two) said: “(Johnson) would 
just have so many more people interested in him. I don't have that many people, maybe it 
wouldn’t be as huge if I was caught.” Two participants acknowledged that the monetary loss for 
Johnson and themselves would not be comparable due to Johnson’s higher market value. “The 
social stuff, yeah,” says one participant (era three) about what would be similar between 
Johnson’s sanctions and their own hypothetical one, “but the money part, it just wouldn’t be as 
big of a deal if it were me.” One of the three participants (era two) said: the size of the scandal 
depends on your hierarchy amongst most Canadian athletes. If (2016 triple Olympic medalist) 
Andre De Grasse fails a drug test now it becomes global. For most others, that’s not the case.” 
          A source of detachment to Johnson’s incident for three (n = 3) of those six participants was 
chronology. One participant, born after 1988, said: “I’m a few generations removed from 
(Johnson and the Dubin Inquiry) so I would say – you know I think of a few more people like 
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Lance Armstrong, I think his doping controversy had more an impact on my life because he was 
closer.” Another participant (era two), when asked whether the incident influenced his or her 
choices about doping, said: “not really – not directly because, obviously my rise to prominence 
was in 2008, that’s 20 years separate. And my real – what made the biggest impression on me - 
was the 95-96-97 world championships. And, again, there was no doping, so I was never under 
the assumption and pretenses that any of these heroes of mine were involved in shady business.” 
Personal reasons for Competing Cleanly 
Participants cited moral judgment, expected social disapproval and an overall landscape 
unfavourable for doping as the most prominent reasons for competing cleanly. Each reason is 
described below, and elements of this overall landscape are divided in further categories. 
Participants of era one believed Johnson’s social sanctions contributed to their expectation of 
social disapproval in response to a positive drug test more than the participants of eras two and 
three. Participants across the sample, however, tended to perceive their personal moral judgment 
as an innate quality uninfluenced by Johnson’s sanctions or other external factors. 
Moral judgment 
          The most cited reasons for competing cleanly was moral judgment. Eight of the nine 
participants (n = 8) claimed that a major deterrent to doping was a belief that it was inherently 
wrong, and that doping defeated the purpose of sport. This belief was so engrained in 
participants that several of them did not even consider the possibility that their personal decisions 
could be based on something else. One of the participants (era three) said: “the main reason, or 
purpose I have for not doping, is that I would never dope because it just wouldn't be me who is 
competing. At the end of the day, I started the sport to see how good I could be, how far I could 
push my body naturally.” Similarly, another participant (era three), when asked what guides him 
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or her in making decisions about doping, said: “actually it’s about moral judgment – it’s wrong. 
It’s just like cheating on a test, you know? I don't think it comes from anywhere in particular 
other than that. If you’re running a race, you’re not actually running the race – you are taking a 
shortcut and so my greatest deterrent is that doping is wrong.” A third participant (era two) said: 
“we have a lot of morals in Canada that are healthy, so I don’t think doping is a problem.” The 
only participant not to cite the inherent immorality of doping trained in the United States, 
whereas the eight other participants did most of their training in Canada. The theme of morality 
as a deterrent to doping never emerged in the interview with this participant. 
Fear of social disapproval  
          Seven participants (n = 7) cited a fear of social disapproval as a deterrent to doping. Out of 
those seven participants, five (n = 5) believed Canadian Olympians that doped faced more social 
consequences than Olympians who doped in other countries. “Social consequences” or “social 
sanctions” were identified in interviews as sanctions fitting Overbye’s definition: condemnations 
by the surrounding world falling outside of sanctions of health, legal, financial or self-imposed 
nature, such as being ignored by fellow athletes or negative reports in the media.87 Main types of 
expected social consequences for doping identified across the sample were a strain on personal 
relationships, damage to one’s reputation, and a denial of advancement opportunities in sport 
during and after one’s career.  
  Participants of era one believed a heightened expectation for social consequences of 
doping existed in Canada because of the precedent that was set by Johnson’s social sanctions. 
One participant (era one) said: “Ben Johnson’s impact on the public and contemporaries in the 
sport was absolutely huge,” said the participant. “ (If someone else was to dope) he would be a 
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total pariah. It’s just not part of our system, so completely unimaginable, how the person would 
be rejected by their close social community, their partners in sport.” A second participant (era 
one) said: “when you dope, it reveals something about you. It’s a personal, character flaw. 
You’re a cheater. I would not want to be known as a cheater to that many people.” This 
participant later admitted that Johnson’s sanctions struck fear of social ostracism in Canadian 
athletes and, through this fear, facilitated decisions to compete cleanly.  
 While participants of era one attributed the belief that social sanctions for doping are 
more severe in Canada due to Johnson’s incident, participants of eras two and three held similar 
beliefs about social sanctions, but attributed this belief to other factors. The most prominent 
factor was a heightened expectation in morality in Canada. One participant (era three) said: “In 
Canada, the thing is cheating is majorly frowned upon, and that’s just the way it is. That’s how 
we are taught.” Another participant (era three) said: “I think we as Canadians value ourselves on 
clean sport, and I know that anybody I work with is also held to those same values.” A third 
participant (era two) said: “I think there is a lot of morals in sport in Canada that are healthy, and 
we are doing it for the right reasons and they click in.” Participants of eras two and three 
believed this moral consciousness to be inherent and intertwined with Canadian customs and 
values, (which, according to participants comprise politeness, honesty, and sportsmanship) 
instead of emergent of any particular incident. 
Elsewhere, three participants (n = 3) across eras believed social consequences for doping 
were severe in Canada because doping was not seen as a necessity to achieve comfortable 
socioeconomic status, as could be the case in other nations. One participant (era one) said: “If 
you fail a drug test in places (like Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom), you 
know, you’re vilified, you’re a bad person, and everyone knows about it. But I think in some 
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countries it’s just shrugged and it’s just part of doing business (...) in some nations it’s seen as 
your way out of poverty, so your reputation takes less of a hit.” Another participant (era three) 
said, “In Canada, you dope, and your lifestyle doesn’t change. You’ll look greedy and stuff like 
that because your basic lifestyle is pretty good, whereas in other countries, your lifestyle will 
change.” That same participant points out that the payoff for high performance is not as large in 
Canada as it is in the United States, making doping less understandable to the Canadian public. 
Health reasons 
          Only two athletes (n = 2) cited health reasons as a deterrent to doping. One participant (era 
two) said: “I just don’t trust even the best performance-enhancing drugs – I don’t know enough 
about them. I wouldn’t trust them even if I’m getting them from a trusted source. You just never 
know what’s in them for sure and how it might affect your body in the long-term.” Another 
participant (era three) believed that any type of doping created a health risk and that, coupled 
with moral judgment, turned the participant away from doping. “I would just feel terrible doing it 
and then I don’t know how it affects my body. Maybe there are side effects.” 
Landscape in Canada not conducive to doping  
          Many participants alluded to a landscape unfavourable to doping in Canada when citing 
factors that encourage them to compete cleanly or discourage them to dope. Various factors 
contributing to this landscape were separated into further categories. Participants cited lack of 
access to drugs (n = 6), extensive education about clean sport in Canada (n = 5), stringent anti-
doping testing (n = 4), and a lack of monetary incentive for doping (n = 3).  
Lack of Access. Six participants claimed access to performance-enhancing drugs is limited, if 
existent at all, in Canada. This was especially true for participants living and training in less 
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densely populated areas within Canada. One participant (era one) said: “I never had the 
opportunity to dope. It was never an option. I was in quite a situation: self-coached out of a small 
province. I was never in a training group, (doping) was never pushed by my government. I was 
never in that possible set-up so I really would have had to go out of my way to dope.” Another 
participant (era two) said: “I guess being from a small community, I never really, it wasn’t 
something that was there.” Similarly, four other participants who trained out of larger Canadian 
centres thought doping might be available if they really sought it out, but did not exactly 
knowing how to access performance-enhancing substances. One participant (era one) speculated 
that they would have had to go to the United States or Mexico had they wanted to gain access to 
drugs. The only participant of the sample who trained in the United States believed performance-
enhancing substances would have been accessible, had this participant sought them out. They 
said: “there was a doctor at our camp who was rumored to sell snake oil. I distanced myself from 
him (...) but some people in our camp failed drug tests.” 
          That being said, no athlete in the sample had been approached by a coach, doctor or 
external source and explicitly offered performance-enhancing substances. One participant (era 
three) believed that this lack of corrupt external influence contributed to clean competition. “If 
you have a coach, doctor or even loved one who actively engages in (doping),” they say, “those 
could all be ways which you would be encouraged to do something like that. But I’ve never 
heard of anyone like that engaging in doping, so I guess I have never been aware that it was even 
an option.” Another participant (era two) says: “I think it’s pretty rare that you see when athletes 
take it upon themselves to dope without the consent of the coach. I truly believe that.”  
Education. Five (n = 5) participants of eras two and three, said that extensive education about 
doping in sport is a possible reason for their personal abstinence. Two participants of era one 
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acknowledged the implementation of an education program in Canada following Johnson’s 
transgression and the Dubin Inquiry, but believed it to be less extensive and effective during the 
time they competed. While they both acknowledged that the education program became more 
rigorous after their active years, it did not have an impact on their personal decisions about 
doping. One participant (era three) says: “on a monthly basis we (Olympic athletes) are doing 
these education modules. I don’t think people understand the degree to which there are all these 
education things that come up.” Another participant (era two) said: “I think the sports 
organizations in Canada do a good job at emphasizing drug-free sport. I knew from a very early 
age that it was taken seriously in Canada.” This participant later stated that athletes were 
educated not only about the perils of doping, but also of what exactly constitutes doping, so as to 
avoid testing positive by accident. A third participant (era two), who had been privy to both 
Canadian and American doping education, believes Canadian athletes spend more time in drug-
prevention workshops than did American athletes. A fourth participant says that continued 
education made them familiar with the consequences. “I have seen what can happen after a 
positive test time and time again outlined by CCES or WADA,” they said. None of these five 
participants that credited Canada’s anti-doping education system traced its current-day 
effectiveness back to Johnson’s scandal. 
Stringent Anti-Doping Testing. Four participants (n = 4), all of eras two and three, 
believed that Canadian track and field’s anti-doping testing (governed by CCES) was stringent 
compared to that of other countries when they competed, and discourages the proliferation of 
doping in Canada. While three of these four participants held a belief that Johnson’s sanctions 
helped anti-doping protocol proliferate in Canada, they more readily attributed the current testing 
protocol to an expectation of moral conduct inherent to Canada. Those participants all believed 
  
 
Cyr 30 
strongly that drug testing is not equal across countries, and that Canadians are held to a higher 
standard than some of their competitors. One participant (era two) said:   
As a Canadian training in America, you saw it. I act on behalf of CCES, on my end, and I 
was tested on multiple occasions on back-to-back days, in one instance twice in one day, 
but the likelihood of me being tested at least every 25 to 30 days was really high, 
regardless of my world ranking. In my camp, I was tested – and this includes (American 
Olympic medalists), there was nobody who was tested as often as me, and that was on the 
behalf of CCES.  But that was just the way Canada wanted to do things, and I totally 
applaud that. 
 
This participant explained the drug testing process they encountered when competing in Jamaica:  
The doping officials came to me, handed me a cup and a clipboard, told me to go away, 
pee and sign the sheet. (...) I wondered to myself: Is that the standard they set? This is 
what the Jamaican athletes have to endure compared to what we endure? (...) For us it’s 
no messing around when we are selected for drug testing. Then there is a flaw in the 
system. 
Another participant (era three) said: “I feel like (the frequent testing) is the difference 
between us and USA, Kenya, and some of these other countries that are medalling. Canadian 
athletes are tested more often than other athletes of other federations, athletes of other countries, 
which I don't think is fair. If you’re top five in the world in Ethiopia or Kenya, you test three to 
four times per year. In Canada, you’re tested 25 times.” A participant of era two, when asked 
about drug testing in Canada, said: “the rest of the world sort of is playing catch up.” One 
participant (era three) said the drug testing protocol in Canada were so stringent that it instills 
fear in clean athletes. This participant said: “we have a bunch of Canadian and world class 
athletes sitting around and they are all paranoid that something accidental will appear in their 
sample, because if it’s there, it will get caught. It could be something accidental from a fast-food 
restaurant, or something in my meat or my spinach (...) it’s one of my biggest fears.” 
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Lack of Monetary Incentive. Not only did the lack of monetary incentive made doping 
less appealing to participants, three participants (n = 3), one of each era, suggested that they 
competed cleanly partly because track and field represented less of a means to an end for them 
than for athletes of some other countries. While some participants acknowledged that doping 
may have presented a possible avenue to make more money in Canada (provided that it were 
available and that dopers would not test positive), participants believed doping could present a 
necessary route to a better life in developing and developing countries. One participant (era two) 
said: “It’s easy to say that we as Canadians have more morals, but I wonder if we really just have 
more of a chance, financially. Having the option to work in other fields permits us to make the 
right decision and run clean. In other countries, I imagine people dope because their families are 
depending on them to make money running.” Another participant (era three) said: “in Canada, if 
an athlete cheats, the lifestyle doesn’t change, but in Kenya you can go from not making it out of 
the country to making big prize money. It’s way higher stakes.” The three participants 
acknowledged that the potential monetary gain related to better performances paled in 
comparison to the drawbacks of doping, “In the end,” said the participant from era three, “I’d be 
bringing home a bit more money every year, but I’d still be living in the same house. I wouldn’t 
trade that for knowing I’ve cheated and the backlash that would come if people found out.” 
Discussion 
The Impact of Johnson  
On anti-doping in Canada 
This study assessed how Johnson’s positive test and the sanctions that ensued resonated 
with Canadian Olympians across time and shaped anti-doping culture in Canada. A key finding 
was that participants of era one fervently believed that Johnson’s scandal contributed to the 
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paucity of doping cases in Canada since 1988. Those participants believed that Johnson being 
shamed and disliked markedly by the Canadian people and media following his positive test 
resonated with athletes. Specifically, they believed Johnson’s social sanctions created an 
expectation of negative social treatment of dopers. Johnson’s social sanctions seem to resonate 
most with the Olympians interviewed. Conversely, participants were mostly unaware of the 
nature of his legal and financial sanctions – few participants knew that Johnson returned to 
competition after having served his first ban and then tested positive again in 1993 and again in 
1999. It is possible that participants were more aware of Johnson’s social sanctions because they 
are considered by elite athletes to be the most deterring type of penalty for a positive test.88 
Participants of era one also believed that the Dubin Inquiry inspired more frequent and effective 
drug testing. Indeed, the Dubin Inquiry resulted in the Canadian Government adopting a much 
more proactive attitude about anti-doping policy, and made Canada join the ranks of the 
governments actively involved in policy-making. 89 
Most participants of eras two and three believed Canadian athletes that doped were 
treated more severely than athletes of other countries and that drug testing was more frequent in 
Canada. None of those participants, however, spoke of a link between Canada’s anti-doping 
policies and Johnson’s transgression until the researcher asked if they thought that such a 
relationship existed during the interviews. The finding that participants of eras two and three 
identified effective doping policies in Canada without initially linking them to Johnson’s scandal 
suggests that scandal, by itself, does not lead to lasting change in anti-doping. It is possible that 
the policies that are driven by crisis and scandal are more important drivers of anti-doping 
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behaviour than the actual scandal over time. The fact that participants of eras two and three did 
not give much thought to Johnson’s scandal when making decisions about doping substantiates 
Storm and Wagner’s finding that the aftermath of a scandal is characterized by a gradual 
lowering of interest about the transgression.90 
Despite feeling knowledgeable about Johnson’s transgression, participants of eras two 
and three said it failed to resonate with them in a particularly positive or negative way and, thus, 
probably with other Canadian athletes. Their perceptions might be linked to a lack of connection 
with Johnson. Some of those participants distinguished major differences between Johnson’s 
reality – one of not only an Olympian, but of a world-class sports superstar – and their own, and 
believed they would not be sanctioned like Johnson because they lack his worldwide fame. 
Participants did not think they were famous enough to evoke attention like Johnson. It is also 
possible that some participants fail to appreciate how ramifications of the Inquiry affected anti-
doping in Canada. Anti-doping policy processes are not fixed and change over time,91 so 
repercussions of more recent doping scandals may better resonate with younger athletes. Two 
participants of era three, for example, claimed that Lance Armstrong’s doping scandal resonated 
with them more than Johnson’s scandal and was more likely to affect their decisions about 
doping.  
Further, participants of era two and three might not have perceived Johnson’s scandal as 
necessary for creating a higher standard of clean sport in Canada, as they believed that such a 
standard has always existed to fit morals that are “inherently” Canadian. The only participant of 
those two eras not to cite morality as an important deterrent to doping trained in the United 
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States, which provides support for the idea that Canadian track and field follows an especially 
demanding moral code. It could be argued, however, that a moral code may seem inherent to 
individuals unaware of the evolution of anti-doping attempts in Canada since 1983 and 
especially after 1988. Indeed, the positive tests of Canadian athletes in Caracas in 1983 and then 
of Johnson in 1988 led to Canadian sport adopting a zero-tolerance policy for doping.92 An 
understanding of this history could provide those participants with a reason, other than an 
inherent and expected code of conduct, why a high standard of morality in Canadian track and 
field exists.  
Three participants, one of each era, thought Johnson’s incident caused negative 
ramifications in Canadian track and field. A participant of era one, whose competitive career 
coincided with Johnson’s, recalls how the incident made fans cynical about the existence of 
clean sport. According to this participant, the level of fan interest in track and field in Canada 
plummeted following Johnson’s positive test. Experts in the field of doping still believe that 
doping breeds cynicism in fans, which, in turn, hurts a sport’s fan base.93 Participants of eras two 
and three did not share the belief that Johnson’s transgression hurt Canadian track and field’s fan 
base. It is possible that those participants fail to appreciate the immediate fan response to 
Johnson’s positive test, which was negative across the country.94 It is also possible that 
participants of era one hold an aggrandized belief that fans felt betrayed because they recall the 
media coverage of the scandal and the inquiry. One participants of era one said that television 
coverage of Johnson’s positive test “made it seem like people hated him.”  Canadian media 
attempted to capture the reaction from the “everyday Canadian” following the scandal, which 
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popularized a national voice that disapproved of Johnson’s decisions.95 Elsewhere, participants 
of eras two and three might not perceive Johnson’s transgression as momentous because they 
have been privy to several other steroid controversies since Johnson’s positive test in 1988. 
On personal decisions about doping 
When it came to personal reasons for competing cleanly, participants said that moral 
judgment and the fear of social sanctions were the main reasons they refrained from doping, and 
that Johnson’s transgression partly factored (era one) and factored negligibly (eras two and three) 
in their decisions about doping. In general, participants across eras believed that events 
surrounding Johnson had less an impact on their personal decisions to dope than did their moral 
judgment. That may not mean Johnson’s sanctions are an unimportant factor in personal 
decisions about doping among Canadian athletes, but that the extent of their importance may go 
somewhat unnoticed by those participants. According to Ritchie, the Johnson incident and the 
ensuing Inquiry led to the very creation of the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES) and 
the CCES’s spirit of sport campaign.96 The spirit of sport language (Appendix D) promotes a 
“values-based” image of sport around the world.97 These sporting bodies that work to develop 
positive morals in athletes may be somewhat responsible for the participants’ moral approach to 
sport.  
Further, a discrepancy exists between the importance participants placed on Johnson’s 
scandal in relation to the doping landscape in Canada, and its limited impact on their own 
personal decision about doping. This is especially true for participants of eras two and three. 
Those participants might prefer to credit strong morals instead of doping deterrents as reasons to 
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compete cleanly in an attempt to answer in a pro-social manner. The belief held across the 
sample that dopers are negatively perceived in Canada may lead participants to believe (or at 
least state, fearing consequences of stating the opposite) that they would refrain from doping 
regardless of the perceived consequences. Bloodworth and McNamee’s claim that athletes may 
be unwilling to honestly discuss the topic of doping with researchers even if anonymity and 
confidentiality are guaranteed by the investigators98 makes it plausible to be sceptical about 
responses related to personal doping attitudes and behaviours. 
The other important personal reason for competing cleanly, found across the sample, was 
the fear of social sanctions. Participants of era one stated that Johnson’s incident helped 
discourage them from doping by simultaneously setting a precedent of severe social shaming of 
dopers and providing an example of the severe consequences that might follow a doping test. 
Participants of eras two and three acknowledged that the scandal provided an example of how 
dopers will be treated in Canada, but it appeared that they did not believe as much that events 
surrounding Johnson created a precedent. Instead, they perceived those events as somewhat 
incidental, and simply demonstrating the consequences of doping in Canada, where a high 
standard of morality was thought to exist. As mentioned earlier, those participants of eras two 
and three maybe answered in such a manner because of a lack of knowledge of the past 
happenings in Canadian sport (including Johnson’s sanction and events surrounding Canada’s 
doping scandal at the 1983 Pan-American Games) that led to the creation of Canada’s anti-
doping policies.99;100 Understanding that events surrounding Johnson’s positive test contributed 
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to a zero-tolerance mentality towards doping in Canadian sport might have led participants of 
eras two and three to further credit the Inquiry for contributing to this expected morality. 
Anti-doping landscape in Canada  
The two main reasons Olympians compete cleanly in Canada were found to be a fear of 
social sanctions as well as a moral consciousness perceived by the participants to be a national 
expectation and an inherent trait. The interviews revealed that reasons outside of morals and fear 
of social sanctioning also contribute to Canadian Olympians’ decisions to compete cleanly. 
Across the sample, participants credited a landscape unfavourable to doping as another reason 
for their decisions to compete cleanly, and for the cultivation of a clean approach to track and 
field in Canada. Elements of this landscape, according to participants mentioned were: effective 
doping education, stringent drug testing and a clean approach to sport by coaches and supporting 
staff, which led to a lack of access to drugs. Participants of era one more often linked those 
outcomes to events surrounding Johnson’s transgression than did participants of era two and 
three. Participants of era three perceived these outcomes as more effective in mitigating doping 
than did participants of other eras. This finding could reflect an increasingly effective application 
of drug testing and education by CCES since Johnson’s scandal, which would give credence to 
Hanstad’s claim that organizational improvement in anti-doping movements like CCES is 
motivated by drug scandals. 101 
Education 
          Participants of all eras were aware of the existence of CCES, the organization (formerly 
known as CADO and then CCDS) founded based on Dubin’s recommendation that Canadian 
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track and field bolster their anti-doping movements in 1990.102 Two of the three participants of 
era one acknowledged that CCES was founded following Dubin’s recommendation, but were 
only somewhat familiar with CCES’ attempts at anti-doping education during their careers. 
Participants of eras two and three acknowledged the effectiveness of CCES’ education protocol 
in anti-doping practice, but only two of the six participants of eras two and three traced the 
creation of CCES back to the Dubin Inquiry. This finding suggests that the memory of Johnson 
becomes increasingly distant in Canadian track and field as time goes by.  According to Storm 
and Wagner, the aftermath of a scandal is characterized by a gradual lowering of interest about 
the transgression and more subtle reflections on its consequences.103 Indeed, participants 
removed in time from Johnson’s scandal may reflect less on its ramifications, which could make 
them less aware of the origin of CCES, despite being very familiar with its proceedings.  
Participants of eras two and three, however, quickly spoke of CCES’ extensive and 
ongoing education protocol which, according to them, was effective in teaching them and fellow 
athletes about what constituted doping and about the consequences (legal, social, and health-
related) that may ensue from a positive drug test. Indeed, informing athletes about the social 
consequences of a positive drug test was found to be an effective strategy against doping.104 As 
well, participants of era three praised CCES’ education modules most prominently and claimed 
to be diligent and knowledgeable about which substances they could and could not ingest. 
Perhaps this reflects positive adjustment in curriculum over the previous decade in response to 
previous research identifying a need for more education when athletes were accidentally 
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breaching WADA’s code.105 Over a decade ago, it was found that the majority of elite athletes 
would welcome further education initiatives to better inform them of doping issues, as they were 
deficient in doping knowledge.106 WADA soon identified education and research as strategic 
priorities for prevention.107 Backhouse and colleagues later found that prevention-based 
programs might be more appropriate in mitigating doping behaviour than common detection-
based deterrence activities.108 The finding that the latest generation of Canadian Olympians felt 
most knowledgeable about what constitutes doping could be a consequence of WADA 
encouraging anti-doping agencies to provide athletes with adequate education.  
Stringent Testing 
Participants (especially of eras two and three) perceived drug testing to be far more 
stringent in Canada than in other countries. Participants of eras two and three credited the drug-
testing work of CCES as meaningful and effective in doping prevention. The small number of 
doping cases in the Canadian Olympic track and field athletes since Johnson’s scandal likely 
speak to Canada’s drug testing protocol - past studies show that athletes were less likely to 
consider doping if there was a high chance of being prosecuted, banned, or humiliated publicly109 
and that the simple prospect of being subject to a drug test in the future acts as a doping deterrent 
for the majority of athletes.110 That deterrence effect, in contrast, according to Overbye and 
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colleagues can be invalidated if athletes do not perceive doping tests as likely or frequent.111 
Most participants in this sample saw drug testing as a frequent certainty in Canada, and several 
participants of eras two and three held perceptions that drug testing was more frequent, and the 
sanctions accompanying a positive test were more severe in Canada than in other countries.  
In accordance with Ritchie’s claim that events surrounding Johnson’s positive test have 
led to stringent anti-doping policies in Canada,112 participants across the sample thought that 
drug testing was extensive and frequent in Canada, and that Johnson’s sanctions inspired 
stringency in drug testing. One participant (era one) said: “since (the Inquiry) the likelihood of 
getting caught for doping in Canada is greater than in other countries.” Participants or eras two 
and three were aware of the connection between the development of stringent testing and 
Johnson’s sanctions. Participants may be more aware of that connection than of the one between 
Johnson’s sanctions and bolstered drug education in Canada because drug testing in Canada 
represents a current topic of contention for its level of stringency. Participants who think athletes 
in Canada are particularly burdened by drug testing might be motivated to learn the origin of 
Canada’s anti-doping protocol. Indeed, one participant (era three) felt targeted by CCES to the 
point where they felt at the mercy of an erroneous positive test, or of a mistake in dietary intake. 
As well, the participant (era two) who trained in the United States, was in favour of CCES’ 
stringent protocol, but found there to be a marked discrepancy between his or her drug-testing 
duties and those of his of her American training partners, even those who were world medalists.  
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Lack of corrupt influences 
         While athletes are ultimately responsible for the decision to use banned performance-
enhancing drugs,113 there are a number of potentially significant reference groups that may play 
an important role in shaping such a decision.114 No participants in the sample admitted to being 
asked or given the opportunity to dope by a coach or member of supporting athletic staff. In fact, 
several participants stated that their own tendency to compete cleanly was, in part, driven by a 
lack of access to performance-enhancing substances - this lack of access being related to their 
coaches’ contempt for doping and complete lack of motivation to seek out illegal options. This 
observation is consistent with Engelberg, Moston and Skinner’s findings that crime is more 
likely to exist in sport when facilitated by some coaches of elite athletes.115 
          Participant interviews revealed that the influence that coaches who encourage doping 
could have in an athlete’s decision to use banned substances should not be understated. Several 
participants acknowledged that corrupt coaches were a key part of the drug problem Canadian 
track and field faced in 1988 - two participants from era one blamed Charlie Francis more than 
Johnson for the latter’s decisions to cheat. When asked why coaches tended to refrain from 
encouraging athletes to dope in recent years in Canada, one participant (era two) said that 
Canada’s corrupt coaches had been “weeded out” by the Dubin Inquiry, and subsequent coaches 
“used that as an example of what could happen if they promote dirty competition.” Indeed, 
during the Dubin Inquiry, Justice Dubin challenged Sport Canada to reprimand coaches as much 
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as athletes for promoting drug use.116 It is possible that enforcing rules around coaches and 
doping in Canada, as well as banning Francis (a coach of multiple Olympic athletes), helped free 
the nation of corrupt coaching influence by the time participants of eras two and three became 
active.  
  Given that coaches of elite adult athletes constitute a central source of influence on the 
conduct of an athlete117 interviewing Canadian coaches for this study was considered. The 
researcher ultimately decided against it for two reasons. First, elite level coaches are fewer than 
elite level athletes in Canada, as each elite training group typically has only one or two coaches. 
The researcher feared not having access to a large-enough sample. Second, Moston and 
colleagues found the role of coaches in influencing the decision-making of athletes to be less 
important than anticipated based on findings from a quantitative WADA-funded report.118;119 
Indeed, in terms of assigning responsibility for doping, it was found that both elite athletes 
(97.9%) and coaches (100.0%) share the view that the athlete was responsible.120  While, as 
mentioned, the interviews revealed that corrupt coaches had an important influence on athletes, 
the researcher chose not to interview these coaches. The researcher anticipated a difficulty of 
finding corrupt coaches in Canadian track and field, due to the few doping cases on public 
record. As well, the researcher doubted that interviews with corrupt coaches would yield truthful 
response about corrupt coaching practices.  
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National Positions Against Doping 
 Participants across eras believed that consequences for doping were, and are, 
more severe in Canada than in other countries. Participants held a strong belief that drug testing 
was not as frequent and drug education modules were not as extensive in certain other nations, 
namely Russia, Jamaica, Kenya, the United States, and Ethiopia. According to Houlihan, 
countries and cultures demonstrate different levels of sincerity when attempting to ensure the 
probity of their domestic sports systems and representative athletes.121 The participants’ belief 
that anti-doping is taken more seriously in Canada than in other countries suggests that clean 
sport is particularly valued in Canada’s sporting culture over the last thirty years. Sport culture, 
which comprises the values, beliefs and practices of colleagues in sport is a particularly 
important factor in decisions about doping.122  
 A cultural position against doping in Canada could be a result of Dubin’s 
suggestion to the Government of Canada to adopt a far more proactive attitude towards anti-
doping policy.123 One participant said (era three): “we don’t (dope) in Canada, it’s not our thing. 
If you do it you’re just, kind of, disowned.” The idea that Canada harbours a stronger cultural 
position against doping than other countries may come from the bias of a fully Canadian sample. 
That being said, the only participant who did not mention morality as a reason to compete 
cleanly had trained permanently in the United States. This participant’s statement corroborated 
                                                          
121 Houlihan, “Policy Coordination,” 312. 
122 Smith et al., “Contextual Influences and Athlete Attitudes to Drugs in Sport,” Sport Management Review 13, no.3 
(2010): 181, https:// 10.1016/j.smr.2010.01.008. 
123 Houlihan, “Policy Coordination,” 324. 
 124 Catherine Carstairs, “The Wide World of Doping: Drug Scandals, Natural Bodies, and the Business of Sports 
Entertainment,” Addiction Research & Theory 11, no. 4 (2003): 263, 
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the findings that consequences for, and feeling about,  doping vary between countries124 and that 
doping behaviour should be investigated across nationalities.125;126 
  
   Conclusions and Future Directions 
Findings from this study, as well as research in the field of doping in Canadian track and 
field127; 128 both suggest that Johnson’s scandal still contributes to a sporting culture that shapes 
anti-doping practices in Canada,129 even though Johnson’s contributions seem to resonate 
decreasingly with Olympians over time. Indeed, events around Johnson’s transgression were 
necessary for the creation of CCES and, consequently, the development of effective education 
protocols and drug-testing methods. As well, Johnson’s transgression played an important role in 
developing the spirit of sport language and a morals-based “image of sport” in Canada.130 
Numerous Canadian sport groups (like True Sport, SIRCuit, and Sport Law & Strategy Group) 
have since adopted this image of sport, which teaches Canadian athletes the values of “honesty,” 
“fair play” and “responsibility.”131 These ramifications of Johnson’s sanctions act as doping 
deterrents for Canadian athletes across eras and irrespective of their knowledge about Johnson’s 
positive test.  
                                                          
125  Daniel Gucciardi, Geoffrey Jalleh, and Robert Donovan, “An Examination of the Sport Drug Control Model with 
Elite Australian Athletes,” Journal of Science & Medicine in Sport 14 (2011): 469, 
https://doi.10.1016/j.jsams.2011.03.009. 
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127 Ritchie, “Lid on the Crisis,” 114-116. 
128 Kidd, Edelman and Brownell, “Analysis of Doping Scandals,” 154. 
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 This study uncovered factors that shape the anti-doping culture of Canadian track 
and field in a time when the doping prevention research paradigm needs to be developed.132;133 
Indeed, doping continues to challenge the legitimacy of sport. Most recently, European law 
enforcement seized 24 tons of raw steroid powder delivered to athletes of 33 countries.134 In 
2018, police in Austria raided the International Biathlon Federation's offices after the agency's 
president was accused of covering up Russian doping cases.135 Doping might continue to be a 
problem in specific areas of the world because differences still exist in how nations approach 
doping scandals and dopers.136; 137 Indeed, there is a need to regulate treatment of dopers across 
nationalities.138; 139 Other nations cannot recreate an event similar to Johnson’s scandal to bolster 
anti-doping. But, the clean approach to sport of participants of eras two and three, despite being 
less knowledgeable about Johnson’s sanctions, suggests that policy might be equally as 
important as scandal in driving change in anti-doping.  Thus, the researcher suggests that nations 
that aim to create an anti-doping culture focus on reproducing anti-doping strategies deemed 
effective by the participants of this study. Strategies include: fostering moral conduct in sport, 
applying severe social sanctions in consequence to positive drug test (like negative exposure in 
the media), frequently drug testing athletes and implementing a rigorous drug education 
curriculum. 
                                                          
132 Lippi, Franchini, and Cesare, “Tour de Chaos,” 625-626. 
133 Lucidi et al., “Adolescents’ Use of Doping Substances,” 449. 
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Limitations and Delimitations 
  The researcher was limited to public record information about the participants’ use of 
performance-enhancing substances, or lack thereof. Any undocumented use of drugs by 
participants, or other Canadian athletes, was not considered when conceiving this thesis. Thus, 
this research operated under the perhaps inaccurate presumption that doping is less a problem in 
Canadian track and field than in most other countries, given the data made public by WADA and 
several media outlets.  In other words, the researcher cannot be fully certain that only two 
Canadian track and field Olympians have doped since Johnson’s transgression – but only that 
two Canadians have tested positive in that time.  
          Elsewhere, an inherent limitation to data collection exists when inquiring about drug use 
in athletes. Although participants were granted anonymity, individuals might have been inclined 
to display certain beliefs, and perhaps shield other ones, that are congruent with social 
acceptance. Participants might have resisted sharing a positive, or perhaps neutral, belief about 
doping to avoid potential social backlash. Moreover, participants might have accentuated or 
exaggerated their negative feelings and attitudes towards banned substances in the goal of 
downplaying their willingness to dope, or experiences with doping. To attenuate feelings of 
uneasiness around doping experience disclosure, participants were reminded at the beginning of 
the interview that they had the right to answer or pass on all questions, and that the researchers 
would follow all measures outlined in the distributed consent form to preserve anonymity. 
Participants were also made aware, again, that member checking would be employed, and that 
they would have one week to review their answers and make changes to the data. 
The researcher anticipated this study to be limited by a difficulty to recruit Olympians, as 
they represent a very small demographic in Canada’s population. A sufficient number of 
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participants, however, were recruited. Prior research suggests that it takes as little as six 
participants to understand the essence of an experience.140 An alternate method to assure 
saturation could have been to recruit participants from only one era (i.e. the 1990s) and seek 
richer data about perceptions of doping unique to that era. The researcher wished, however, to 
examine how perceptions around Johnson’s sanctions changed over time. This stipulation limited 
the researcher to two to four participants representing each decade following the Dubin Inquiry. 
Although those numbers may appear low, prior case study research has achieved thick, rich data 
by comprising as little as two participants.141 
Thus, the participants recruited represented Canada in different eras and, perhaps 
consequentially, their perception of doping sanctions in Canada, as well as their knowledge of 
Johnson’s scandal and the Dubin Inquiry, widely varied. A concern of the research was that 
many participants of eras two and three would not be familiar with Johnson and the sanctions 
applied to him. But, given the wide reach of the Inquiry, its prominence on television and, later, 
its extant presence in media productions, participants were substantially aware of Johnson’s 
transgression and of many ensuing consequences. Thus, the sample was generally well informed 
on the topic. 
          Finally, a limitation common in qualitative doping research is that samples typically 
consist of non-doping athletes.142 Indeed, all participants, according to public record information 
appear to compete – or have competed – cleanly. Due to the scarcity of documented doping cases 
in Canadian track and field, the researcher would not have achieved a meaningful sample by 
interviewing athletes who have doped. It is to note that participants were not deliberately asked 
                                                          
140 Guetterman, “Descriptions of Sampling Practice,” Article 25. 
141 Irene Agyepong and Sam Adjei, “Public Social Policy Development and Implementation,” Health Policy Plan 
23, no. 2 (2008): 150-160, https://doi:10.1093/heapol/czn002. 
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whether they used performance-enhancing substances during their careers, so the researcher 
cannot know for sure if participants were in fact clean competitors. Participants are further 
expected to have been clean competitors because, as Engelberg and colleagues point out in their 
research with doped athletes: athletes that have committed deliberate violations (and have not yet 
detected) are unlikely to participate in research studies which might result in insights into their 
behaviour that would facilitate their detection.143 
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        Literature Review  
          This review examines negative perceptions of doping in sport, and presents five prominent 
doping choice models to better explain factors influencing doping behaviour in athletes. 
Similarities and common origins of these models – notably, their use of cost-benefit analysis, a 
concept grounded in criminal deterrence theory, are discussed. The researcher then presents 
frequently researched categories of doping sanctions, and comments on their reported 
effectiveness as doping deterrents. The researcher follows this discussion by revisiting two 
important events in Canada’s history of doping in sport: Canadian Pan-American Games scandal 
of 1983, and Ben Johnson’s highly documented transgression and ensuing sanctions of 1988. 
This review concludes with a comparison between the national response to Johnson’s 
transgression and those of three other countries following doping scandals of their own. Such 
responses foreshadow contrasts in doping behaviour between athletes of those countries.  
 Doping in Sport 
          Researchers traditionally have discouraged illicit substance usage in sport due to ethical 
concerns,144; 145 health concerns146; 147 as well as due to the negative public image of sport it 
conveys.148 Despite these discouragements from research, and despite WADA’s several efforts to 
eradicate doping since its founding, doping is still one of the biggest issues the competitive 
sports world faces.149 The IOC states that the use of banned performance-enhancing substances 
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in sport is both unhealthy and contrary to the ethics of sport.150 Working to eliminate the use of 
illicit performance-enhancing substances in sport is necessary to protect the physical and 
spiritual health of athletes, the values of fair play and of competition, the integrity and unity of 
sport, and the rights of those who take part in it at whatever level.151 For a substance to be 
considered illicit in sport, it must be included in WADA’s Prohibited List. To be included on the 
Prohibited List, a substance must meet two of the three following criteria: it enhances or has the 
potential to enhance sport performance, it presents an actual or potential health risk to athletes, 
and it violates the spirit of sport.152  
The Spirit of Sport 
           The spirit of sport (Appendix D) is a standard of justice as it aims to ensure that athletes 
can compete on a fair and equal footing.153 Since the creation of WADA in 1999 and the first 
iteration of the World Anti-Doping Code in 2003, the spirit of sport clause in the Code has been 
the cornerstone justification for anti-doping world-wide, as it serves as the central ethical 
justification for anti-doping.154 Similarly, the central justification for the prohibition of drugs in 
the Olympic Games is that drugs are contrary to the spirit of sport.155 This justification is part of 
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a historical project to proffer an image of the Olympics as a “pure” form of sport.156 While some 
researchers criticize the spirit of sport clause for its ambiguity in language and have suggested to 
replace it with a more robust account of health-risk in sport,157 others defend the clause as an 
ideal that defends a characterization of sport without making claims to an absolute definition.158 
The spirit of sport clause was partly created in response to the IOC’s various crises of legitimacy 
in anti-doping lawmaking, and to the enduring problem of not being able to formulate a clear 
definition of “doping.”159 The spirit of sport language (Appendix D) provided a way of dealing 
with those problems and inconsistencies with anti-doping issues while promoting a values-based 
image of sport.160 
Efforts Towards Doping Prevention 
          While the spirit of sport clause may help in shaping a meaning for clean sport, the lack of 
philosophical definition for doping, according to former WADA president Dick Pound, has 
always been a problem.161 Perhaps consequentially, doping has persisted over the years, 
soliciting research on reasons for doping. Leading questions in research on doping include: why 
do some athletes develop favourable attitudes towards using prohibited substances, why do 
certain athletes accept its use in their competitors, and why do athletes appeal to such 
practices.162 In a review of 33 studies, published between 2000 and 2011, Morente-Sánchez and 
Zabala reported that the initial reasons given by elite athletes for using banned substances 
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included: achievement of athletic success by improved performance, financial gain, improving 
recovery, prevention of nutritional deficiencies, and the idea that others use them.163 These five 
following techniques, frameworks and models aid in identifying and conceptualizing factors that 
influence an athlete’s decision to dope, or to refrain from doping. 
Techniques, Models, and Frameworks 
Choice Modelling 
          Choice modelling is an established research technique based in random utility theory164 
that helps reveal the relative importance of various factors influencing decisions, such as 
athletes’ decision to dope.165 Athletes are presented with “choice sets:” three choice factors (e.g. 
level of peer pressure, financial loss) with three probabilities (e.g. low, medium, high) 
corresponding to these factors. By systematically varying the levels of the factors across the 
series of choice sets – as determined by the statistical experimental design – the relative 
importance of each of the factors is estimated in the choice model and weighed against each 
other in coming to a decision about doping.166 A criticism of this modelling is the lack of 
empirical evidence supporting either the content or processes of athlete decisions to use 
performance-enhancing substances. 
Life Cycle Model of Performance Enhancement 
           Developed by Petroczi and Aidman, this model cites sport psychology and the 
development of goal-directed behaviour as an explanation for the use of performance-enhancing 
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substances over an athlete’s career.167 Still in its early stages of development, this structure 
suggests that mechanisms predicting the use of banned drugs in sport relates to the nature of 
one’s behaviour towards goal-achievement (prestige, achievement or performance) moderated by 
a trade-off between vulnerability (e.g. risk-taking or self-esteem) and factors inhibiting drug use 
(social norms or health concerns).168 This model makes an assumption that rationality is the 
process that governs how external variables come together to influence athletes’ decisions to use 
banned substances,169 despite dispute as to whether rationality is the best explanation of the 
process that governs performance-enhancing substances use in athletes,170 and drug use more 
broadly.171 
Drug Use in Sport Model 
          This model developed by Stewart and Smith, unlike others already presented, makes no 
assumptions about the processes governing how variables come together in influencing one’s 
decision to dope. Instead, it cites a list of antecedents to use of (or abstinence from) drugs, based 
on an existing empirical relationship with other forms of drug use or athlete behaviour.172 The 
model combines the micro orientation of individual athlete and interpersonal behaviour with the 
macro orientation of sporting context, structure, and culture. As the authors draw from 
sociological (commercial pressure and government funding), interpersonal (social sanction and 
masculine sports culture), intrapersonal (personality and personal morality) and sport 
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management perspectives to provide a listing of variables presumed to influence banned 
performance-enhancing substance use.173 The problem with specifying content without a 
governing process is that while the model identifies target variables to guide intervention, the 
effect of intervention is left unspecified. For example, it is unclear how modifying the structural 
constraint of the prevailing view of sports medicine to drugs in sport would affect athlete PESM 
use.174 
Drugs in Sport Deterrence Model 
          The DSDM by Strelan and Boeckmann (2003) comprises three elements: (1) the costs of a 
decision to use, (2) the benefits associated with using, and (3) the specific situational factors 
which may impact in some way the cost-benefit analysis of using.175 The model posits that 
individuals’ behaviour is determined by a conscious and careful cost-benefit analysis of the 
likely consequences of a particular course of action. Athletes weigh deterrents (costs) and 
benefits against each other in deciding whether to dope. These deterrents and benefits exist in a 
theoretical framework, which is used to guide researchers in identifying what mechanisms deter 
elite athletes from doping and which of these mechanisms, either independently or jointly, are 
the most effective deterrents.176 
          The DSDM model is the first to weigh relative effects of commonly considered benefits 
and deterrence mechanisms against each other. Benefits are divided into social, material and 
internalized categories. Deterrents are classified in four categories: legal sanctions, social 
sanctions, self-imposed sanctions, and health concerns. The relationship between benefits and 
deterrents and one’s decision to consume banned substances is moderated by situational factors, 
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such as drug use prevalence perceptions, experience with punishment and punishment avoidance, 
and type of drug.177 This model, however, comes from a hypothetical based study and was 
designed as a starting point, so its findings are reviewed with caution. 
The Sport Drug Control Model 
          This model resembles the DSDM for its account of appraisal of benefits and deterrents (or 
threat) in coming to doping decisions, but is more inclusive of other social-cognitive constructs 
that are determined to predict doping attitudes and intention.178 Preliminary findings suggest that 
appraisals of threat, benefit and morality all may help predict doping attitudes. In addition, 
morality helped predict doping susceptibility.179 
          Similarly, the SDCM suggests athletes’ compliance or non-compliance to the World Anti-
Doping Code (WADC) are driven by three general areas: appraisals (threat and benefit), 
individual differences in the athlete (e.g. personality) and the influence of reference groups (e.g. 
sport governing bodies.)180 Compliance in this case refers to avoiding anti-doping rule violations 
such as abstaining from drug use or submitting to drug testing.181 Non-compliance may be 
continuing to use undetectable drugs or subverting the testing process (e.g. tampering with test 
protocols).182 A possible limitation to this model is its assumption that compliance with the 
WADC corresponds with the abstinence of drug use. Therefore, using this model for 
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interventions may result in compliance with the code without full abstinence from doping.183 
          Mentioned models reference and allude to the cost-benefit analysis inherent to 
Paternoster’s criminal deterrence theory. The theory is a highly influential approach to 
understanding criminal decision-making.184 It posits that individuals will have strong intentions 
to perform a behaviour if they have a positive attitude towards it, they perceive it as easy to 
perform, and they believe that important others would support their performance of the 
behaviour.185 Specifically, criminal deterrence theory suggests that when individuals contemplate 
committing a crime they weigh up the costs and benefits of doing so.186 In deterrence theory it is 
assumed that if the perceived likelihood of detection is increased (e.g., through the introduction 
of more or better tests), or the severity of consequences is increased (e.g., larger fines, longer 
bans), then the deterrent effect is similarly increased. 
Some researchers, however, have deemed criminal deterrence theory too simplistic to 
predict doping behaviour and, in consequence, ineffective for doping research.187 A possible 
explanation for the theory’s shortcoming in doping deterrence is that the perceived likelihood of 
drug detection is probably very low amongst athletes, and this low likelihood of testing positive, 
respective to Pratt and colleagues’ supposition of a relationship between likelihood of detection 
and deterrent effect, makes a cost-benefit analysis seem unneeded.188; 189 Indeed, WADA’s 
former president Pound, near the end of his career acknowledged the small number of athletes 
who are caught was an underestimation of the problem, and suspected that many athletes, up to 
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90%, doped despite passing drug tests.190 Criminal deterrence theory is also criticized in helping 
to predict and prevent doping behaviour because it fails to take into account that doping 
behaviour is influenced by not only situational factors, but also personality structure.191 
          But, despite its shortcomings, criminal deterrence theory should not be overlooked, as its 
cost-benefit analysis is still central to athletes’ decisions regarding doping today.192 Overbye and 
colleagues’ more recent finding that, athletes are more likely to comply with the law if they 
perceive the costs of breaking it as outweighing the benefits193 corroborates criminal deterrence 
theory’s cost versus benefit approach. As well, deterrence is still the main form of enforcement 
used by WADA in anti-doping operations.194 In the specific case of this research, using criminal 
deterrence theory did not only seem appropriate because of its ubiquitous role – though not 
always central – in competing doping decision models, but also because the research question 
examines whether participants factor Johnson’s sanctions in a form of cost-benefit analysis when 
coming to decisions about doping. As well, this study investigates perceptions of elite athletes. 
Deterrence strategies are more likely to resonate with elite athletes when coming to such 
decisions, given what they stand to gain from a competitive advantage and how much they have 
to lose from apprehension.195 
Categories of Doping Sanctions 
  Despite the role of deterrence in several of these anti-doping models, much of WADA’s 
anti-doping funds is dedicated to promote research about doping detection rather than 
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prevention.196 It is suggested that anti-doping organizations should shift and direct efforts 
towards doping prevention.197;198 The main current doping deterrence prevention strategy is to 
ban athletes from sport if caught, but research suggests that several types of sanctions can act as 
important doping deterrents.199 This section explores four categories of sanctions that can act as a 
perceived cost of doping,200; 201 and that Johnson endured following his positive test.  
Bans from Sport 
          A ban or expulsion from sport, referred to in some literature as a “legal ban” is one of the 
three main types of sanction threats to which individuals respond, along with social and self-
imposed sanctions.202 A ban of this nature, often administered to dopers by WADA, may get 
athletes to refrain from using illegal performance-enhancing substances, and it is so severe that 
in itself, it is a deterrent to doping.203 WADA’s attempts to deter doping through the use of bans 
from sport, however, appears to have met only limited success,204 with some researchers  
declaring such efforts to be an outright failure.205 More recent research shows that the 
condemnation by the surrounding world that athletes can experience when testing positive, as 
well as the financial costs and feelings of guilt and shame, are greater deterrents as punishments 
than a ban from sport for three quarters of elite athletes.206 
Social Sanctions  
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Social sanctions often accompany the fear of legal sanctions for cheating in sport.207; 208 
Examples of social sanctions are condemnations by the surrounding world that athletes can 
experience if tested positive, such as being ignored by fellow athletes or being the subject of 
negative reports in the media.209 Recent research shows that 77 per cent of elite athletes, 
regardless of gender, age, sport type and previous experience of doping testing, viewed social 
sanctions as a greater deterrent than that of a legal ban.210 Specifically, the risk of being exposed 
in the media is a greater deterrent than the fear of letting down family and friends and being 
shunned by peers,211 while disapproval from the athletes’ social environment (coach, family or 
peers within their sport) is still regarded as being a great deterrent by the majority of athletes, 
regardless of gender, age and sport type.212 
          The power of social sanctions seems consistent across countries. A qualitative study 
comprising 40 talented British athletes indicated that social and self-imposed sanctions (like 
feelings of shame) were significant reasons for refraining from doping.213 Scottish athletes 
reported that social isolation, along with the ban from sport was the most significant deterrents to 
doping, as they feared the social marginalization that may ensue.214 
Financial Sanctions 
           Much like the fear of ban from sport can be eclipsed by the fear of social sanctions, it can 
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be overshadowed, or at least accompanied, by the fear of financial consequences.215 Financial 
penalties can include doping violation fines, but must also be considered to be subsequently 
occurring sanctions, for example, the financial costs athletes can experience if tested positive, 
such as terminated sponsoring contracts.216 Financial sanctions were perceived as greater 
deterrents to dope than a ban from sport itself in 47 percent of high performance athletes across 
40 different sports.217 Concurring with this statistic, an Australian study found that financial loss 
following from the detection of doping is more of a deterrent than the career (legal) sanctions.218 
          Moreover, financial reasons influence athletes’ considerations of whether to dope or not 
when confronted with hypothetical questions219 whereas financial loss is the most frequent 
external deterrent to dope in high performance athletes.220 Athletes are also less likely to 
consider using performance-enhancing substances if they feel subject to large fines and see no 
financial gain emerge from doping. Conversely, financial gain was cited as a main reason for 
doping.221 
Self-Imposed Sanctions 
          Self-imposed sanctions relate to individual moral values, which may deter athletes from 
doping, such as feelings of guilt that athletes can experience if tested positive.222 54% of elite 
athletes perceive self-imposed shame as a greater doping deterrent than a ban from sport,223 and 
external pressures of social and moral expectation and anticipated re-integrative shame was 
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reported as significant motivations not to dope.224 Moreover, internal factors (feeling guilty and 
letting yourself down) was found to be the greatest deterrent to dope in elite athletes having 
admitted to doping.225 Such pressures like expected feelings of guilt or shame and condemnation 
of other athletes’ practices might be contingent on the particular doping culture and climate, 
suggesting that dope shaming may differ between countries,226 and that the sporting culture in 
which athletes operate is a strong determinant of their attitudes towards doping.227 
Ben Johnson and Doper-Shaming in Canada 
          After his positive test, Johnson suffered aforementioned sanctions, like social rejection, 
negative media spotlight, financial burden, and a ban from sport. Indeed, Johnson’s sanctions 
could have set an example of how dopers are treated in Canada. By publicly shaming star athlete 
via the Dubin Inquiry, the Canadian government and media arguably set a resonating precedent 
for how dopers would be treated and sanctioned in Canada. This section attempts to explain 
Canadian sport’s vociferous disapproval of Johnson’s actions by exploring the evolution of 
doping policies in Canada before Johnson. The researcher explores how disowning the nation’s 
best and most prominent Olympic athlete could have discouraged doping in the nation for years 
following the scandal.  
 
History of Doping in Canadian Track and Field 
According to Ritchie, most Canadians are familiar, at least in general terms, with 
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Johnson’s fall from grace and the Dubin Inquiry.228 The original creation of Canada’s anti-
doping policies, however, come from an event less known to Canadians229 and dates back to an 
earlier scandal that took place during the Pan American Games in Caracas, Venezuela in 1983.230 
Surprise testing at those games led to 16 athletes testing positive, including Canadian 
weightlifters Guy Greavette and Michel Viau.231 Greavette, an Olympic hopeful, relinquished the 
gold and silver medals he won at the games, while Viau was stripped of two bronze medals. Both 
athletes were given a two-year ban and missed the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics.232   
          While part of the Canadian response to the weightlifters’ doping was instructive – the 
then-Chef de Mission for Team Canada’s Olympic team Barry Nye was categorical in his 
condemnation of the athletes – certain Canadian sport authorities reflected an appreciation for 
the realities of high-performance sports in the 1980s.233 Canadian Olympic Association technical 
director Jack Lynch defended the cheating athletes by stating “let’s face it, this is competition. 
You play to win. This isn’t recreation.”234 Despite eliciting varying responses from Canadian 
authorities, the event and year were pivotal for anti-doping in Canada235 as Sport Canada quickly 
commissioned the country’s first policy – Drug Use and Doping Control in Sport.236 Arguably, 
this policy ultimately influenced the direction of anti-doping in Canada in the long run.237 
Increasingly a ‘hard line’ was taken after 1983 by managers of the Canadian sport system, and 
had both intended and unintended consequences in terms of other policies’ influence on the lives 
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of athletes, public thinking about doping, and the specific direction policy makers would take 
after 1983.238 
          Indeed, while anti-doping progressed somewhat in the years between the “Caracas 
Scandal’ and 1988, it was events in the latter year that pushed Canadian sport authorities to truly 
reinforce anti-doping239 and lead Canada to develop and adopt some of the most stringent anti-
doping policies in the world.240 By 1988, Sport Canada had issued a revised and stronger policy 
statement, stating that they could “be regarded as a nation not only doing its duty to ensure that 
standards of fair play (…) are upheld, but as a country endeavoring to provide significant 
international leadership in this important area.”241 Before the 1988 Olympic Games, Johnson 
held the potential to represent the image that Canada had of itself and wanted the world to see.242 
First, Johnson had the opportunity to perpetuate Sport Canada’s expectation of the successful 
clean athlete, and his seemingly imminent success as an Olympic athlete compelled the media to 
identify him as a heroic substitute for Wayne Gretzky.243 Second, Johnson’s Jamaican heritage 
and Canadian citizenship made him an ideal representative of Canada, the world’s first nation to 
officially legislate a Multicultural Act (coincidentally in 1988.)244 Johnson’s success in a 
Canadian singlet would communicate the country’s acceptance of representation through its 
immigrants, and its celebration of multiculturalism and difference.245  Effectively, Johnson’s 
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momentary triumph was dubbed the most important event in Canada’s sport history.246 The day 
following the race, Canada’s best selling newspaper the Toronto Star stated that Johnson’s run 
“buoyed up a whole nation of sports fans” and the newspaper’s central headline read “Ben’s Pure 
Gold: Johnson Blasts to World Record in 9.79 Seconds.”247 
           When Johnson’s tested positive and was disqualified, the shame sent shock waves across 
Canada where he became a national idol.248 Johnson’s transgression sent an emotional wave that 
swept the country.249 The media’s disapproval of Johnson was nationwide. Members of Canadian 
government openly claimed to national broadcasting companies that Johnson would never run 
for Canada again,250 and popular Canadian newspapers communicated their disproval for 
Johnson by publishing headlines like “The Fastest Junkie on Earth” and “Disgrace.”251  A 
broadcast anchored by Peter Mansbridge at the CBC aired on national television was entitled 
“Ben Johnson, Canada’s shame.”252 Indeed, the media’s representation of the event framed and 
reproduced the averse reactions of politicians, sport administrators, high-profile media pundits 
and “everyday” Canadians, which contributed to the social construction of a crisis in national 
identity.253 Children wept and sportswriters anguished in print over the disgrace of the man who 
had become the nation’s “No. 1” hero in the wake of the departure of Wayne Gretzky to Los 
Angeles.254  Johnson’s positive test elicited shame, anger and frustration in Canadians.255 The 
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scandal’s relevance in Canadian culture reached a high point when Canadian athletes suspected 
of having doped alongside Johnson, and Johnson himself, were compelled to testify at the 
government-sponsored and ordered Commission of Inquiry Into the Use of Drugs and Banned 
Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance (commonly known as the Dubin Inquiry). 
The inquiry involved 119 witnesses, produced 14,817 pages of testimony and cost Canadian 
taxpayers $3.6 million.256 Although the inquiry was not legally binding, and the main 
perpetrators were not forced to testify, the inquiry reserved itself the right to conduct lengthy 
investigations on these perpetrators. Refusal of testimony would risk adversely affecting the 
reputation and futures of individuals.257 The momentous inquiry resulted in charges to Johnson’s 
teammate Angella Issajenko, his Physician Jamie Astaphan, his coach Charlie Francis, his 
therapist Waldemar Matuszewski and Johnson himself, when they all admitted to rampant drug 
use. 258 
          The inquiry’s reach, ubiquity in the media and entertainment factor engaged many 
viewers. Each week, television broadcasts and morning newspapers created the script for and bill 
of particulars against the next week’s witness, and made of the scandal the “watershed of the 
modern steroid controversy.”259 The inquiry was so far-reaching and created such stigma around 
drug use that no politician could even call for medically supervised steroid use.260 The 
investigation culminated in Johnson exposing himself to the nation and the world in 1989 by  
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taking the stand and confessing his wrongdoing. “I lied,” said Johnson between tears. “I lied and 
I was ashamed for my family, my friends and other Canadian athletes. I was just in a mess.”261 
After the Scandal  
          It is suggested by Houlihan that for most countries, as was the case in Canada following 
Johnson’s positive test, policy-making and agenda setting is driven by crisis and scandal with the 
stimulus for many governments being the desire to maintain the utility of international sport as a 
tool of foreign policy and general positive public relations.262 In Canada, the Dubin Inquiry led 
to the creation of the Canadian Centre for Drug-Free Sport (CCDS) in the early 1990s 
administered increasingly stringent anti-doping policies, tested athletes, trained certification 
officers, and produced information regarding testing procedures, policies, and the ‘dangers’ of 
drugs. CCDS amalgamated with Fair Play Canada in 1995 to become the Canadian Centre for 
Ethics in Sport (CCES), which still exists today, and the CCES’s spirit of sport campaign.263 
While the campaign was short-lived, the language from it was transferred and used in WADA’s 
code, which still harmonizes anti-doping policies, rules and regulations around the world.264 
CCES as an organization still exists today and oversees both anti-doping policies in the country 
while simultaneously promoting various positive values and practices in sport.265 
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The Aftermath of Doping Scandals 
Canadian anti-doping proliferated in response to Johnson’s scandal.266; 267 Doping 
scandals often direct policy making268 and lead to organizational change in anti-doping.269 Storm 
and Wagner’s anatomy of the sports scandal, suggests that change following a scandal is 
achieved by going through phases. Specifically, the third phase of a scandal (following 
transgression and public disclosure) is moral discussion, where the transgression that led to the 
scandal is acknowledged and discussed, and solutions are sought.270 This stage leads to change in 
the sporting environment.271 Three doping scandals and their aftermath are presented below and, 
along with data presented below in Table 1, they suggest that emphasis placed on moral 
discussion and articulation of pejorative discourse about the transgression is crucial in driving 
positive change. Analogously, an apparent absence of this phase seems to delay positive change.  
Russia’s Transgression 
When Johnson tested positive, the Canadian media held him accountable for his 
transgression and painted him a pariah.272 Russian authorities, in contrast, in their current 
response to their ongoing doping scandal, are calling the claims against their athletes 
“groundless” and dismissing the claims as attempts to discredit Russian sport.273 Further, when 
certain athletes previously found to be dirty were reinstated by the IOC after serving their ban, 
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they were celebrated instead of shamed. A state-backed sports broadcaster aired the nearly two-
hour cross-country ski race won in 2014 by Alexander Legkov, one of the athletes whose appeal 
was upheld. Twice before, Legkov had been suspended for doping.274 
Russian sporting officials denied the existence of a state-sponsored doping program. 
Sport and government authorities including President Putin, however, tend to publicly shame  
former anti-doping chief Grigory Rodchenkov for this problem more prominently than they 
publicly shame athletes who doped. Notably, President Putin has publicly dismissed Rodchenkov 
as an “idiot”275 and the former head of Russia’s Olympic Committee between 2001 and 2010, 
Leonid Tyagachev told the media that Rodchenkov should be “shot for lying (about the existence 
of the doping program), like Stalin would have done.”276 Perhaps for this lack of opprobrious 
discourse and moral discussion about the athletes’ transgressions, the doping problem in Russia 
is ongoing. Russian athletes accounted for half the on-site doping bans at the first Olympic 
games following Russia’s reinstatement into the IAAF in Pyeongchang.277  
Finland’s Scandal  
A second example concerns Finnish Nordic skiers and, though likely less prominent and 
known in Western culture, seems to bring forth a similar relationship between discourse and 
discussion about the sanction and the amount of subsequent positive tests. In 2001, Finland 
Nordic skiers were condemned for doping for the world championship when their star athlete Jari 
Isometsa, along with six others, tested positive for hydroxyethyl starch, an intravenous volume 
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expander.278 The doping infraction made headlines in European – and specifically Scandanavian 
– media after the Finnish government commanded the World-Anti-Doping Agency (specifically, 
a three-member commission) to step in and conduct drug tests on the entire Finnish team.279 
When the athletes were proven guilty, the bust elicited so much shame that the managing director 
of the Finnish Ski association resigned saying that he had failed to stop the skiers from breaking 
the rules, and people in Finland regarded the scandal as national catastrophe.280  Finland 
President Tarja Halonen said she felt “sorrow, disappointment and concern.”281 Finland, like 
other northern nations, tends to have a sense of itself as pure and clean and, according to 
Carstairs, this doping scandal affected how Finns regarded their nation.282 According to public 
record and to the researcher’s best knowledge, only two Finnish cross-country skiers have tested 
positive for doping in the 18 years following the shameful scandal.283; 284 
America’s scandal 
A third example exists in recent track and field and resides somewhere of the middle of 
the other cases mentioned in terms of response to scandal and ensuing doping behaviour. This 
example pertains to prolific American athlete Marion Jones’ admittance to doping. Before her 
demise, the sprinter was one of the most recognizable athletes of her era and a global superstar. 
Comparably to Johnson, Jones had been an Olympic hero in her nation.285 At the 2000 Games in 
Sydney, Australia, Jones won five medals (three gold and two bronze) and was celebrated by 
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American media and featured on the covers of the U.S. magazines such as Sports Illustrated, 
Time, and Vogue where she was hailed as “greater than gold” and the “new American hero.”286 
Seven years after her win, however, Jones publicly admitted to lying to federal prosecutors about 
steroid use (she acknowledged using a steroid from 2000 to 2001). She was sentenced to six 
months in jail, a two-year ban from competition and 800 hours of community service.287 
The media’s response was merciless and reminiscent to that of Johnson’s transgression. 
The incident received attention commensurate with Jones’ status and fame.288 The majority of 
the commentary regarded Jones alone as blameworthy, and the prevailing attitude was that of 
scorn and moral outrage.289 Jones was variously described as a “tarnished girl [who] can’t outrun 
the truth”, a “disgrace,” a “disgraced” former Olympian, a “drug cheat,” a “pathological liar,” 
and, perhaps most fittingly, the “new Ben.”290 Tim Dahlberg of LA Times wrote, “I’d be lying if I 
didn’t think she was getting what she deserves”291 while columnist Philip Hersh proclaimed, 
“Marion Jones fall from grace is complete.”292 Interestingly, since Jones’ conviction of early 
2008, the rate of doping among American track and field athletes has lowered, but has not 
completely plummeted. Three sprinters from the United States have been sentenced for doping 
since the incident.293 Though the number pales in comparison to 41 – the number of American 
track and field athletes who have faced doping sanctions in the last 30 years - it represents more 
positive tests than Canada since Johnson’s scandal in roughly one third the time. Jones’ case 
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varies from Johnson’s, however, with respect to the time elapsed between victory and busting, as 
public interest about a scandal gradually decreases with time.294 While Johnson tested positive 
three days following the scandal, seven years passed between Jones’ rise and fall. 295 
          These scandals vary in the amount of opprobrious discussion and athlete social sanctions 
that follow them, which gives credence to Carstairs’ claim that there are differences in how 
nations handle doping scandals socially.296 It is unsurprising that such a variance exists. 
Considering that WADA’s code has been implemented in different ways across national sport 
organizations.297;298 Further, this variance in expected social sanctions could have important 
ramifications for doping behaviour. Research has established that perceived social sanctions 
impact an athlete’s cost-benefit analysis of doping.299 Perhaps for that reason, the number of 
doping bans on public record varies heavily between nations since 1988 (table 1). 
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Table 1 
Doping bans in Olympic Track and Field Athletes per country since 1988, based on 
public record data.300 
Country Doping Bans Population (rounded to nearest 10,000) 
    
Russia* 101 144,500,000  
United States 41 327,200,000  
Morocco 17 35,740,000  
Jamaica 16 2,890,000  
Turkey 16 79,810,000  
Belarus 13 9,510,000  
Spain 12 46,720,000  
Brazil 10 209,300,000  
Britain  8 66,040,000  
Australia 4 24,600,000  
Canada  2 37,060,000  
* The number of actual doping infractions in Russia is estimated to be higher (McLaren, 
2016).  
Note: Warnings are not included 
 Indeed, the variance between nations in the number of Olympic track and field athletes 
who tested positive since 1988 supports researchers’ claims that there is a need to investigate 
doping behaviour across nationalities.301; 302 Little research exists about how doping behaviour is 
affected by scandal. One reason for this gap in literature is that individual athletes strive to 
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protect images from athletes in scandals by establishing scandal response strategies via media.303 
Another reason is that athletes are often unwilling to discuss the topic of doping with 
researchers.304 The researcher expects much positive change to have happened in Canada since 
Johnson’s sanctions, given the extensive amount of opprobrious discussion around those 
sanctions. Thus, an investigation into this potential positive change may be worthwhile. 
Specifically, it is worthwhile to explore reasons for clean behaviour in Canadian athletics, in the 
goal of learning about effective deterrence strategies to help prevent doping in other 
demographics.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Question Guide  
Q1: What were you views on doping and dopers when you competed?  
 
Q2: Have those perceptions changed with time? If so, how? 
 
Q3: Are you fully aware of the consequences that accompany a positive drug test? What are 
those consequences? (assess their rank of what the worst consequences are). 
 
Q4: Were you aware of opportunities for doping and if so, what factors influenced athletes’ 
decision to engage in doping? 
 
Q5: During your career, what did you perceive as being the cost(s) of doping?  
 
Q6: During your career, what did you perceive as being the benefit(s) of doping?  
 
Q7: What do you know about the story of former Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson? 
 
Q8: Are you familiar with the Commission of inquiry into the use of drugs and banned practices 
intended to increase athletic performance (commonly known as the Dubin inquiry)? If so, what 
are your opinions of that inquiry and of its findings? 
 
Q9: If so, did does Ben Johnson and the Dubin inquiry have an impact on your perception of 
doping sanctions? 
 
Q10: Do you think the consequences for doping are different in Canada than they are in other 
countries?  If so, why, if not, why not? 
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Appendix B: Consent to Participate in Research Form 
 
 
                               CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Title of Study: Canadian Track and Field Olympians’ Perspective of Doping Deterrents in 
Canada 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by You are asked to participate in a research study 
conducted by Alex Cyr and Craig Greenham, Ph.D from the Department of Human Kinetics at the University of 
Windsor. Results will be contributed to Alex Cyr’s Master’s thesis project. If you have any questions or concerns 
about the research, please feel to contact Alex Cyr. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The specific goal of this study is to understand how a nation’s precedent treatment of dopers impacts athletes’ doping 
behaviour and their feelings towards doping. Based on the three elements of Strelan and Buckland’s Drugs in Sport 
Deterrence model (DSDM), (the costs of a decision to use, the benefits associated with using, and specific situational 
factors that may impact in some way on the costbenefit analysis of using), which are derived from Paternoster’s 
criminal deterrence theory, (1987). 
 
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked take part in one (1) semi-structured interview between 
only him or her and the researcher. Interviews are anticipated to last 30 to 60 minutes and will be conducted through 
Skype. The researcher will request participants’ permission to contact them via email following the interview if one or 
more of the participants’ responses require clarification. Participants will only be contacted once following the 
interview, in the event of publication, to notify them of the study’s publication, and to assure them once again of 
anonymity. Throughout the analysis of the data, the writing of the final paper, and following possible publication, the 
researcher will be available for any follow-up questions participants might have, but otherwise will not solicit 
participants. 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
 
There is low psychological and emotional risk associated with the study, outside of participant being asked questions 
they are uncomfortable answering. Participants, however, will not be obliged to answer any one or number of 
questions. 
 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
By investigating Olympians’ perception of doping sanctions in Canada, we may uncover whether or not social 
shaming of dopers deters future doping behaviour. Participants’ contribution to this study could serve a benefit to 
society (more specifically, Canadian sport) by helping to develop doping deterring techniques. 
 
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION 
Participants will not be compensated for their participation in this research. 
 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
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Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain 
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. Data collected from this study (i.e. interview tapes and 
transcripts) will be stored in a locked cabinet in my supervisor’s (Dr. Craig Greenham) office in the Human Kinetics 
building at the University of Windsor and will be destroyed two years after possible publication. Data may be released 
and used for written reports or academic conferences, but participants’ names shall never be revealed. The 
recordings of the interview will be accessible to you for review for one week following the interview. Otherwise, only 
my supervisor (Dr. Craig Greenham) and I will have access to the tapes. After two years, the recordings will be 
deleted and destroyed. It is to note that the information collected, and the linkage of interview and public record data, 
presents limitations to confidentiality and may identify an individual through a combination of indirect identifiers and 
responses.  
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You can stop taking part in this research at any time, for any reason, 
without penalty. If you choose to stop taking part, you can tell me in person, by phone, by email, or in a letter. You will 
receive continuing opportunities to decide whether or not you wish to participate. The investigator may withdraw you 
from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. In such event, the participant will have the option of 
removing their data from the study. 
 
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
A summary of this data will be available upon possible publication. Additional summaries will not be developed. 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.  
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact:  Research Ethics Coordinator, 
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail:  ethics@uwindsor.ca 
SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANT/LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE 
 
I understand the information provided for the study Canadian Track and Field Olympians’ Perspective of Doping 
Deterrents in Canada as described herein.  My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to 
participate in this study.  I have been given a copy of this form. 
 
______________________________________ 
Name of Participant 
 
______________________________________   ___________________ 
Signature of Participant       Date 
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
_____________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Investigator      Date 
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Appendix C: Letter of Information  
 
 
 
 
 LETTER OF INFORMATION FOR CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
 
Title of Study: Canadian Track and Field Olympians’ Perspective of Doping Deterrents in 
Canada 
 
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Alex Cyr and Craig Greenham, Ph.D from the 
Department of Human Kinetics at the University of Windsor. Results will be contributed to Alex Cyr’s Master’s thesis 
project.  If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Alex Cyr.  
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The specific goal of this study is to understand how a nation’s precedent treatment of dopers may impact Canadian 
athletes’ feelings towards doping.  
PROCEDURES 
 
If you volunteer to participate in this study, you will be asked to: you will be asked take part in one (1) semi-structured 
interview between only him or her and the researcher. Interviews are anticipated to last 30 to 60 minutes and will be 
conducted through Skype. The researcher will request participants’ permission to contact them via email following the 
interview if one or more of the participants’ responses require clarification. Participants will only be contacted once 
following the interview, in the event of publication, to notify them of the study’s publication. Throughout the analysis of 
the data, the writing of the final paper, and following possible publication, the researcher will be available for any 
follow-up questions participants might have, but otherwise will not solicit participants. 
 
POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS 
There is low psychological and emotional risk associated with the study, outside of participant being asked questions 
they are uncomfortable answering. Participants, however, will not be obliged to answer any one or number of 
questions. 
POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO PARTICIPANTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
 
By investigating Olympians’ perception of doping sanctions in Canada, we may uncover whether or not social 
shaming of dopers deters future doping behaviour. Participants’ contribution to this study could serve a benefit to 
society (more specifically, Canadian sport) by helping to develop doping deterring techniques. 
 
COMPENSATION FOR PARTICIPATION 
 
Participants will not be compensated for their participation in this research.  
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you will remain 
confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission. Data collected from this study (i.e. audio files and 
transcripts) will be stored in the researcher’s research computer – locked with a passcode only known to the 
  
 
Cyr 92 
researcher - and will be destroyed two years after possible publication. Data may be released and used for written 
reports or academic conferences, but participants’ names shall never be revealed. 
 
The recordings of the interview will be accessible to you for review for one week following the interview. Otherwise, 
only my supervisor (Dr. Craig Greenham) and I will have access to the recordings.  
 
PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You can stop taking part in this research at any time, for any reason, 
without penalty. If you choose to stop taking part, you can tell me in person, by phone, by email, or in a letter. You will 
receive continuing opportunities to decide whether or not you wish to participate. The investigator may withdraw you 
from this research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. The investigator may withdraw you from this 
research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. In such event, the participant will have the option of removing 
their data from the study.   
FEEDBACK OF THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY TO THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
A summary of this data will be available upon possible publication. Additional summaries will not be developed. 
 
SUBSEQUENT USE OF DATA 
 
These data may be used in subsequent studies, in publications and in presentations.  
 
RIGHTS OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact: Research Ethics Coordinator, 
University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario N9B 3P4; Telephone: 519-253-3000, ext. 3948; e-mail: ethics@uwindsor.ca 
 
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR 
 
These are the terms under which I will conduct research. 
 
 
_____________________________________   ____________________ 
Signature of Investigator      Date 
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Appendix D: Spirit of Sport Language 
What, exactly, is the ‘spirit of sport’?  
By: Ian Ritchie1 
“At the most obvious level, in terms of anti-doping policy the World Anti-Doping 
Agency’s World Anti-Doping Code justifies the ban on certain substances and methods 
based on the premise that they contradict sport’s spirit: ‘Anti-doping programs seek to 
preserve what is intrinsically valuable about sport’ the Code states as its ‘Fundamental 
Rationale’. ‘This intrinsic value is often referred to as “the spirit of sport”, it is the 
essence of Olympism.’ The Code also goes on to list a host of sub-values that 
characterise sport’s spirit, including ‘fair play’, ‘health’, ‘excellence’, ‘character and 
education’ and ‘joy’.2 The ‘spirit of sport’ language has become prominent since the 
creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency’s first Code in 2003. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Ian Ritchie, “Pierre de Coubertin, Doped ‘Amateurs’ and the ‘Spirit of Sport’: The Role of Mythology in Olympic 
Anti-Doping Policies,” The International Journal of the History of Sport. 31, no. 8 (2014): 820, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2014.883500. 
2 World Anti-Doping Agency, “World Anti-Doping Code,” 14. 
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